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On April 22, 2021, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the Federal Trade
Commission cannot continue to seek monetary relief from wrongdoers through § 13(b)
of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act—the authority predominantly relied
on to challenge lawbreaking in federal court.
This news followed a string of mounting criticisms in recent years that have
undermined public confidence in the Agency. A decade ago, after the FTC largely
stood idle against abuses by subprime lenders, Congress stripped the Agency of key
authorities over the financial sector. Today, concerns about the adequacy of the FTC’s
antitrust enforcement and about its effectiveness as a privacy and data protection
watchdog are once again raising questions about whether the FTC can protect the
public from digital abuses.
Today’s crisis of confidence can be traced back to the 1980s. During that decade,
Chairman James C. Miller III and his lieutenants took control of the Commission,
and professed faith in the idea that markets could be trusted to regulate themselves.
They supported crippling cuts to the Agency’s budget and headcount, while shifting
the Commission’s focus away from combating corporate abuse. They also shelved the
Commission’s strongest tools to deter lawbreaking, turning instead to § 13(b), the
authority now limited by the Supreme Court. While § 13(b) was an important tool,
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it did not allow the Commission to actually seek penalties against wrongdoing, and
it is best suited to one-off enforcement rather than ensuring compliance market-wide.
This has meant that for large firms and other established corporate actors, breaking
the law can be a good bet.
In this Article, we detail why the Agency should resurrect one of the key
authorities abandoned in the 1980s: § 5(m)(1)(B) of the FTC Act, the Penalty
Offense Authority. The Penalty Offense Authority is a unique tool in commercial
regulation. Typically, first-time offenses involving unfair or deceptive practices do not
lead to civil penalties. However, if the Commission formally condemns these practices
in a cease-and-desist order, they can become what we call “Penalty Offenses.” Other
parties that commit these offenses with knowledge that they have been condemned by
the Commission face financial penalties that can add up to a multiple of their illegal
profits, rather than a fraction.
Using this authority, the Commission can substantially increase deterrence and
reduce litigation risk by noticing whole industries of Penalty Offenses, exposing
violators to significant civil penalties, while helping to ensure fairness for honest firms.
This would dramatically improve the FTC’s effectiveness relative to relying
exclusively on equitable monetary relief and no-money cease and desist orders.
We demonstrate in this Article that in a number of key areas, including urgent
concerns like online disinformation, the Commission can deploy the Penalty Offense
Authority immediately. This can increase deterrence, since firms will pay a significant
price for engaging in unfair or deceptive practices previously condemned by the
Commission. We also outline how the Commission can deploy this authority to combat
emerging harms, including illegal targeted marketing and deceptive data harvesting.
We close with a call for a broader rethinking of the Commission’s approach to
combatting corporate misconduct. By inventorying its existing tools and deploying
them strategically, the Commission can begin to turn the page on its checkered record
and regain the public’s confidence.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court recently ruled that the Federal Trade Commission
cannot seek monetary relief in federal court through § 13(b) of the FTC Act.1
This decision has been described as an existential threat to the FTC’s mission
of promoting fair markets.2 That is because even though the Commission has
many other powers, § 13(b) is the primary means by which the Agency brings
enforcement actions in federal court. This singular reliance is recent, and its
origins are ideological.
In the 1980s, the FTC fundamentally reoriented its consumer protection
mission, moving away from combatting market-wide abuses by major
corporations and toward a heavy focus on shutting down fly-by-night criminal
scams through civil law enforcement actions.3 At the time, the leading
proponent of this shift was James C. Miller III, who became Chairman of the
Commission in 1981.4
Miller arrived following a moment of crisis for the Agency, which had
been derided as the “National Nanny” when it sought to crack down on child-

AMG Cap. Mgmt., LLC v. FTC, 141 S. Ct. 1341, 1344 (2021) [hereinafter AMG v. FTC].
See, e.g., Brent Kendall, Supreme Court Cuts Federal Trade Commission Powers to Recover Ill-Gotten
Gains, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-cuts-federal-trade-commission-powers-torecover-ill-gotten-gains-11619102862 (Apr. 22, 2015, 5:52 PM) [https://perma.cc/FHP8-ZGY2].
3 See Miles W. Kirkpatrick, Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Special
Committee to Study the Role of the Federal Trade Commission, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 70-71, 81 (1989)
(noting that the FTC was devoting an increasing share of resources to challenging outright fraud,
while facing criticism for having “failed to bring cases of consequence”); Neil W. Averitt & Terry
Calvani, The Role of the FTC in American Society, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 39, 48 (1986) (noting the Reaganera FTC’s focus on “hard-core fraud”).
4 See generally Luke Herrine, The Folklore of Unfairness, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 431 (2021).
1
2
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directed advertising.5 For Miller, this crisis was an opportunity to not only
reverse rulemakings but also disarm the administrative state. During his
confirmation process before joining the Commission, he argued that the FTC
should move away from rulemaking and toward efforts to “reinforce market
forces,” while shifting enforcement resources to challenging small-scale
criminal fraud rather than misconduct by established corporate actors.6 Miller
was also highly skeptical of the Commission’s authority to prohibit unfair
practices, and vowed to rein it in.7 He and his lieutenants instead espoused
the view that markets could largely be trusted to regulate themselves.8
Once confirmed, Miller moved quickly to dismantle the Agency and upend
its mission. So aggressive were these changes that they drew bipartisan
opposition,9 but they largely succeeded. Miller supported dramatic staffing
reductions, and by the end of the 1980s, the Agency’s headcount had been
halved.10 He opposed efforts to actively monitor markets, and in 1985, the
Commission announced that it would halt publication of its annual Line of
Business Reports, cutting off a critical set of data.11 Under his watch, the
number of rulemakings and enforcement actions plummeted,12 and the Agency
adopted Policy Statements that limited its own authority to combat unfair and

Id. at 503-04.
See Mark E. Budnitz, The FTC’s Consumer Protection Program During the Miller Years: Lessons
for Administrative Agency Structure and Operation, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 371, 377-80 (1997) (explaining
Miller’s views during his nomination process).
7 Id.
8 Miller believed that “the best consumer protection possible is provided by a well-functioning
marketplace.” JAMES C. MILLER III, THE ECONOMIST AS REFORMER: REVAMPING THE FTC,
1981–1985, at 9 (1989). During his confirmation hearings, he argued that the government should not
intervene to protect “a few gullible people” from deception and suggested that challenging unfair
practices would no longer be a priority for the Commission. See Budnitz, supra note 6, at 378-79.
9 For example, Republican Commissioner Patricia P. Bailey spoke out against changes to the
Commission’s deception standard. See FTC’s Authority Over Deceptive Advertising: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. for Consumers of the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., 97th Cong. 53 (1982) (statement of
Hon. Patricia P. Bailey, Comm’r, Federal Trade Commission) (“All of the proposals which have been
advanced so far to alter the statute’s language would substantially narrow the FTC’s authority over
deceptive practices.”). Miller’s efforts to close regional offices also drew bipartisan opposition. See
Budnitz, supra note 6, at 387-90 (detailing the political controversy of Miller closing regional offices).
10 See FTC Appropriation and Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) History, FTC [hereinafter FTC
Appropriation History], https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/office-executive-director/financialmanagement-office/ftc-appropriation [https://perma.cc/2XNM-YMB4] (showing a headcount change of
full-time employees from 1,719 in 1980 to 894 in 1989).
11 See FTC, BUREAU OF ECON., STATISTICAL REPORT: ANNUAL LINE OF BUSINESS
REPORT 1977, at 1 (1985), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/u.s.federaltrade-commission-bureau-economics-annual-line-business-report-1977-statistical-report/231945.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YK6H-A8R2] (“This is the last in a series of five Annual Line of Business Reports
(ALBRs) to be published by the Commission . . . .”).
12 See Budnitz, supra note 6, at 391-95 (describing the drop-off in enforcement cases under
Miller’s tenure); id. at 435-36 (describing the drop-off in rulemaking).
5
6
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deceptive practices.13 The cases that the Commission did bring increasingly
targeted small-time scams rather than abuses by large corporate actors.14
Miller left the Commission in 1985, but the changes he wrought were longlasting. Although subsequent Commissions began to revive the use of unfairness
and challenge corporate misconduct,15 the Commission’s headcount remains far
below what it was when Miller was appointed,16 the Policy Statements he

13 With respect to deception, the Commission announced that it would prosecute cases only if
representations were likely to mislead reasonable consumers about a material fact, which limited the
Agency’s authority to combat more subtle misrepresentations or misrepresentations that harmed less
sophisticated consumers. See Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, app. at 176 (1984)) (“[T]he
Commission will find deception if there is a [material] representation, omission or practice that is
likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment.”).
This weakened standard drew bipartisan opposition from Congress, state attorneys general, and
Miller’s fellow commissioners. See Budnitz, supra note 6, at 396-404 (describing the controversy
around Miller’s redefinition of “deception”). Miller also sought to weaken the Commission’s
unfairness standard, and he urged Congress to amend the FTC Act to narrow the Agency’s authority.
Id. at 409. This effort did not initially succeed, but in 1984, the Commission formally appended to an
opinion its Policy Statement on Unfairness, which stated that markets should be presumed to be “selfcorrecting.” See Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, app. at 1072 (1984) (“Normally we expect the
marketplace to be self-correcting, and we rely on consumer choice—the ability of individual
consumers to make their own private purchasing decisions without regulatory intervention—to
govern the market.”). In a comment filed in early 2020, we detailed how the Commission’s post-1980
unfairness standard—which has largely been rejected by other consumer protection enforcers—has
hobbled FTC enforcement in the decades since. See FTC Comm’r Rohit Chopra, Comment Letter
on Proposed Rule Defining Unfair or Deceptive Practices, 5-6 (May 28, 2020) [hereinafter Comment
Before the Dep’t of Transp.], https://www.regulations.gov/comment/DOT-OST-2019-0182-0225
[https://perma.cc/LW3C-Y6R6] (click “download”).
14 See sources cited in supra note 3 and accompanying text.
15 For example, in 2012, the Commission used its unfairness authority to challenge lax data
security practices by Wyndham Hotels. Press Release, FTC, FTC Files Complaint Against
Wyndham Hotels for Failure to Protect Consumers’ Personal Information (June 26, 2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/06/ftc-files-complaint-against-wyndhamhotels-failure-protect [https://perma.cc/DHS5-LSMJ]. That same year, it also sued a major apparel
manufacturer for making unsubstantiated weight loss claims, returning $40 million to consumers.
See Press Release, FTC, Skechers Will Pay $40 Million to Settle FTC Charges That It Deceived
Consumers with Ads for “Toning Shoes” (May 16, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2012/05/skechers-will-pay-40-million-settle-ftc-charges-it-deceived
[https://perma.cc/B2TX-ABKN]. These cases show that § 13(b) can be deployed to challenge
misconduct by large corporations, but they also underscore the limits of the authority. Skechers
compensated victims but paid no actual penalty, while Wyndham Hotels paid nothing at all. See
FTC v. Skechers U.S.A., No. 12-01214, 2012 WL 1699432, at *10 (N.D. Ohio May 16, 2012)
(specifying that no portion of the Skechers settlement constitutes “any fine, penalty, or punitive
assessment”); Press Release, FTC, Wyndham Settles FTC Charges It Unfairly Placed Consumers’
Payment Card Information at Risk (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2015/12/wyndham-settles-ftc-charges-it-unfairly-placed-consumers-payment (settling with
Wyndham without requiring payment).
16 See FTC Appropriation History, supra note 10.
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championed continue to restrict the Agency’s authority, and combatting small
scams remains the FTC’s principal consumer protection priority.17
The Commission’s track record since the 1980s raises serious questions
about the wisdom of Miller’s ideological project. In key sectors of commerce,
the FTC’s post-1980 view that markets are self correcting has been proven
wrong—sometimes disastrously. For example, the Commission’s ideological
opposition to deploying its unfairness authority prevented the Agency from
challenging child-directed tobacco advertising in the early 1990s.18 While the
Agency later tried to reverse itself under congressional pressure, it was
ultimately action by state attorneys general—not the FTC, and not market
forces—that halted these practices.19
During the run up to the mortgage meltdown, the FTC focused its
financial enforcement efforts on small-scale fraud, rather than systemic
failures. The FTC largely stood idle as “legitimate” lenders, like
Countrywide and Ameriquest, tricked Americans into taking out subprime
loans that were structured to fail.20 These unfair and deceptive practices “self17 See, e.g., Staying a Step Ahead: Fighting Back Against Scams Used to Defraud Americans: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection, Prod. Safety, & Data Sec. of the S. Comm. on Com., Sci.,
& Transp., 115th Cong. app. at 51 (2017) (response to written questions submitted by Hon. John
Thune, Chairman, S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp. to Hon. Maureen K. Ohlausen, Acting
Chairman, Federal Trade Commission) (“[F]ighting fraud is at the core of the FTC’s consumer
protection mission.”).
18 See John Harrington, Up in Smoke: The FTC’s Refusal to Apply the “Unfairness Doctrine” to Camel
Cigarette Advertising, 47 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 593, 594-95 (1995) (detailing the Commission’s 3–2
vote to close its investigation of R.J. Reynolds despite substantial evidence that its marketing practices
were unfair); see also Dara J. Diomande, The Re-Emergence of the Unfairness Doctrine in Federal Trade
Commission and State Consumer Protection Cases, 18 ANTITRUST 53, 55 (2004) (noting that the
Commission’s revised unfairness standard helped doom its initial investigation of R.J. Reynolds).
19 See Press Release, FTC, Joe Camel Advertising Campaign Violates Federal Law, FTC Says
(May 28, 1997), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/1997/05/joe-camel-advertisingcampaign-violates-federal-law-ftc-says [https://perma.cc/U5LF-EZSW] (announcing that the
Commission would sue R.J. Reynolds after receiving congressional requests to “reopen a prior
investigation of the Joe Camel campaign”); Press Release, FTC, Federal Trade Commission
Dismisses Joe Camel Complaint (Jan. 27, 1999), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/1999/01/federal-trade-commission-dismisses-joe-camel-complaint
[https://perma.cc/NMT6-H52T] (announcing that the Commission’s complaint had been mooted
by the multistate tobacco settlement).
20 See Financial Services and General Government Appropriations for 2009: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Appropriations Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. & Gen. Gov’t, 110th Cong. 255 n.11 (2008) (statement of
Lydia B. Panes, Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission) (listing
FTC enforcement actions related to mortgage lending). Consistent with this heavy emphasis on fraud,
when the FTC did sue the nation’s largest subprime lender in 2007, it was to challenge do-not-call
violations; Ameriquest’s lending practices went unchallenged. Press Release, FTC, FTC Announces
Law Enforcement Crackdown on Do Not Call Violators (Nov. 7, 2007), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2007/11/ftc-announces-law-enforcement-crackdown-do-not-call-violators
[https://perma.cc/6DUJ-AM59]. In contrast, states acted early to challenge unfair predatory lending—
including practices by Ameriquest. See, e.g., Press Release, Iowa Dep’t of Just., Off. of the Att’y Gen.,
States Settle with Household Finance up to $484 Million for Consumers (Oct. 11, 2002),
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corrected” in the form of a global economic meltdown. The FTC’s
underenforcement contributed to Congress’ stripping the Agency of major
authorities over the financial sector, including rulemaking on mortgages, debt
collection, and credit reporting.21
During that same decade, the Agency largely ignored the explosion in
predatory for-profit colleges, which fueled a massive number of student loan
defaults.22 This inaction led to enormous costs to both consumers and
taxpayers.23 Similarly, even as fraud and delinquencies rose in the auto
market,24 the FTC declined to take comprehensive action to protect military

https://www.iowaattorneygeneral.gov/newsroom/states-settle-with-household-finance-up-to-484million-for-consumers [https://perma.cc/X2GE-5HEU] (describing state-led settlement with
Household Finance for deceptive lending practices); see also Press Release, Off. of Ill. Att’y Gen.,
Madigan, Martinez: Ameriquest to Pay $325 Million and Reform Lending Practices to Resolve States’
Investigation (Jan. 26, 2006), https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2006_01/20060123b.html
[https://perma.cc/DKC9-C7S4] (reporting about the Illinois settlement against Ameriquest for “unfair
and deceptive conduct that amounted to predatory lending and put people at risk of losing their homes”).
21 As the mortgage crisis worsened during this era, the FTC’s inaction against unfair lending
practices was criticized with growing intensity. In 2008, Senator Byron Dorgan accused the FTC of
being “absent” on subprime lending, while others, including Senator Bill Nelson, zeroed in on the
Agency’s failure to challenge unfair lending products. See Improving Consumer Protections in Subprime
Lending: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Interstate Com., Trade, & Tourism, of the S. Comm. on Com.,
Sci., & Transp., 110th Cong. 9, 21 (2008). One year later, at another hearing where the FTC’s
enforcement track record was challenged, another witness described the Agency as being
“completely passive” in using its unfairness authority against subprime lending. See Consumer Credit
and Debt: The Role of the Federal Trade Commission in Protecting the Public: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Com. Trade, & Tourism, of the H. Comm. on Energy & Com., 111th Cong. 99-100 (2009) (statement
of Ira Rheingold, Executive Director, National Association of Consumer Advocates).
Members of Congress also criticized the FTC’s unfairness standard, which had been narrowed
in the 1980s. For example, in 2007, the Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee,
Representative Barney Frank, argued there was “broad consensus” that the Agency’s standard was
too rigid to tackle emerging unfair lending abuses. See Improving Federal Consumer Protection in
Financial Services: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 40 (2007). At the same
hearing, then-Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Chair Sheila Bair called unfairness a
“restrictive legal standard,” and argued that Congress should consider enacting a more flexible
standard to tackle some of the most problematic practices of the era. Id.
22 See generally Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra, FTC, University of Phoenix, FTC
File No. 1523231, 2019 WL 6838771 (F.T.C.) (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public_statements/1557180/152_3231_statement_of_commissioner_rohit_chopra_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7ZTV-HD38] (describing the FTC’s track record on enforcement actions against
for-profit college deception); ADAM LOONEY & CONSTANTINE YANNELIS, THE BROOKINGS INST.,
A CRISIS IN STUDENT LOANS? HOW CHANGES IN THE CHARACTERISTICS OF BORROWERS AND
IN THE INSTITUTIONS THEY ATTENDED CONTRIBUTED TO RISING LOAN DEFAULTS (2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LooneyTextFall15BPEA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SY6T-SGUE].
23 See LOONEY & YANNELIS, supra note 22.
24 See Ben Eisen & AnnaMaria Andriotis, An $809 Car Payment, a $660 Income: How Dealers
Make the Math Work, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2019, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/an-809-carpayment-a-660-income-how-dealers-make-the-math-work-11576924201 [https://perma.cc/BKK3-GKHF]
(reporting on the growing prevalence of fraud in auto finance).
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families and the general public, in spite of Congress having given the Agency
specific authority to do so.25 These are just a handful of real world examples
where government inaction resulted in massive harm for consumers, small
businesses, and the economy.
Restoring the FTC as a vigorous check on corporate abuse is long
overdue. This means not only reorienting the Agency to focus on the largest
problems in the marketplace, but also resurrecting the legal tools that were
shelved during the Miller era.26 Then-Commissioner Chopra made this a key
focus during his tenure.
Director Chopra has not called on the Agency to return to its pre-1980
approach. Rather, he believes the Commission should be monitoring and
analyzing emerging business practices by major industry players, while
inventorying its existing authorities to identify how it can better correct and
deter wrongdoing. For example, he has highlighted the Agency’s long unused
competition rulemaking powers,27 and has pointed to problems stemming
from how the Agency has underused its unfairness authority.28 He has called
on the Commission to rethink its reliance on case-by-case enforcement, and
to issue restatement rules that increase deterrence without imposing any
burdens on businesses.29 He has argued that reviving these tools should be a

25 See 12 U.S.C. § 5519(d) (authorizing the Commission to issue baseline protections for auto
consumers and directing the Commission to work with other agencies to combat illegal practices
targeting service members). This inaction has come under criticism. See, e.g., GIDEON WEISSMAN,
R.J. CROSS, ED MIERZWINSKI & LUCY BAKER, AUTO LOAN COMPLAINTS RISE 5, 29 (2020),
https://uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/AutoLoanComplaintsRise/WEB_USP_CFPB-AutoLoan_Report_1020_v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4DG-XRV4] (calling on the Commission to deploy
its dormant rulemaking authority to combat growing problems in the auto market).
26 See supra notes 10–14 and accompanying text.
27 See generally Rohit Chopra & Lina M. Khan, The Case for “Unfair Methods of Competition”
Rulemaking, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 357 (2020) (calling for the use of rulemaking under § 5 of the FTC Act).
28 See Comment Before the Dep’t of Transp., supra note 13, at 1-2 (encouraging the Department
of Transportation to abandon efforts to adopt the FTC’s post-1980 unfairness standard).
29 See Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra, FTC, Activating Civil Penalties for Made in
USA Fraud, 2019 WL 1766100 (F.T.C.), at *1 (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public_statements/1514808/chopra_-_activating_civil_penalties_for_made
_in_usa_fraud_4-17-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6JT-MAFS] (calling on the Commission to issue a
Made in USA rule); Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra, FTC, Regarding the Report to
Congress on the FTC’s Use of Its Authorities To Protect Consumer Privacy and Security, FTC File
No. P065404, 2020 WL 3473532, at *1 (June 17, 2020) [hereinafter Statement Regarding the Rep. to
Cong. on Privacy and Security], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/
1577067/p065404dpipchoprastatement.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DAR-5S5V] (calling on the
Commission to inventory, publish, and deploy its unused rulemaking powers); Statement of
Commissioner Rohit Chopra, FTC, Regarding the Report to Congress on Protecting Older
Consumers, FTC File No. P144400 (Oct. 19, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
public_statements/1581862/p144400choprastatementolderamericansrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/2A5GQZ5A] (calling on the Commission to initiate a restatement rulemaking).
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key priority of the Commission, regardless of the Commission’s equitable
authorities under § 13(b).
This Article highlights another power that the Commission should resurrect:
the Penalty Offense Authority, codified in § 5(m)(1)(B) of the FTC Act.30 This
provision, which authorizes the Commission to seek civil penalties for first-time
offenses, can be used to systematically eradicate unfair or deceptive practices
through administrative adjudication and market participant notification. It is a
unique tool in commercial regulation that has the potential to dramatically
increase the Agency’s effectiveness.31 The Agency can use the authority not only
to correct harmful practices, but also to deter them, while providing unusually
strong due process for defendants.32 Deploying this authority should be part of
a broader shift away from one-off enforcement actions and toward systematic
efforts to combat widespread harms.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I outlines the Commission’s
authorities to seek monetary remedies, including the challenged authorities
under § 13(b) of the FTC Act. Part II details the drawbacks of the Commission’s
heavy reliance on seeking equitable monetary relief through § 13(b), rather than
seeking civil penalties under other authorities. Part III describes the Penalty
Offense Authority and details the key advantages that the authority confers.
Finally, Part IV offers examples where a penalty offense strategy would be
particularly fruitful, including actions the Commission can take almost
immediately to significantly step up its deterrence of harmful practices.
I. Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Authorities and its
Heavy Reliance on § 13(B)
Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits unfair and deceptive practices and
unfair methods of competition.33 When the Commission has reason to believe
that § 5, or other laws it enforces, has been violated, it can sue to halt the
violations either in an administrative proceeding or in federal court.34
When proceeding administratively, the Commission files a complaint,
which an administrative law judge (ALJ) adjudicates according to the
Commission’s current Rules of Practice.35 After hearing the evidence, the ALJ
issues an Initial Decision setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of law,

30
31
32
33
34
35

15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B).
See infra Part III.
See infra notes 100–108 and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
15 U.S.C. § 45(b).
16 C.F.R. § 3.11–.13.
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which the full Commission can later review.36 The Commission then issues a
final decision and order, which can be appealed to a United States Court of
Appeals and then to the Supreme Court.37
The Commission can also file complaints in a U.S. District Court.38 When
it does so, it essentially assumes the role of any other plaintiff in federal court.
Cases are heard by an Article III judge (or in rare cases, a jury), and rulings
can be appealed to the Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court.
There are various remedies the Commission can seek depending on where
it is filing its complaint, and under which authorities it is doing so. In the
remainder of this Part, we detail the key remedies available to the
Commission, the tools with which it can seek these remedies, and the
Commission’s overwhelming recent reliance on a single one of these tools—
§ 13(b) of the FTC Act.
A. Overview of Remedies Available to the Commission
There are generally two categories of remedies the Commission can seek
in litigation: injunctive relief and monetary relief.39 As detailed further below,
injunctive relief can be either permanent or preliminary, while monetary relief
encompasses both equitable monetary relief and civil penalties.40
An injunction is a court order that compels or restrains a party from
engaging in a particular act.41 For example, the Commission will frequently
seek cease-and-desist orders, whereby parties are directed to halt their
lawbreaking conduct.42 The Commission can also seek “fencing-in” relief—
remedies to prevent parties from continuing their lawbreaking, such as
requirements that outside monitors be appointed.43 When issued following a
trial or dispositive motion, injunctions can be permanent. However, the FTC
can also seek preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders under
certain circumstances.44

16 C.F.R. § 3.51.
15 U.S.C. § 45(c).
15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A).
39 See Table 1 infra.
40 Id.
41 Injunction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
42 A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative, Law Enforcement, and
Rulemaking Authority, FTC (May 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcementauthority [https://perma.cc/54N2-3UZX].
43 See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 395 (1965) (“Having been caught violating
the [FTC] Act, respondents ‘must expect some fencing in.’” (quoting FTC v. Nat’l Lead Co., 352
U.S. 419, 431 (1957))); Telebrands Corp. v. FTC, 457 F.3d 354, 357 n.5 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding the
Commission can seek injunctions “that are broader than the conduct that is declared unlawful”).
44 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
36
37
38
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In addition to injunctive relief, the Commission can seek monetary relief
from wrongdoers, which generally takes the form of either equitable relief or
civil penalties. Equitable monetary relief is designed to restore the status quo
absent the wrongdoing. This has traditionally been accomplished in one of
two ways: wrongdoers can be ordered to turn over their illegal earnings—a
remedy known as disgorgement—or they can be ordered to compensate
consumers for their losses, a remedy known as restitution.45 These remedies
can often be mirror images of one another, but they are conceptually distinct
and could yield different outcomes. For example, suppose a corporation
charged consumers $90 million in inaccurate late fees, which was the result of
corner cutting that saved the corporation $10 million. Under those
circumstances, the company’s total unjust gains were $100 million, while
consumers’ losses totaled $90 million.
Importantly, regardless of how the remedy is characterized, courts in
equity generally award only direct consumer losses or direct illegal earnings
or avoided costs. Monetary awards that exceed revenue or losses may be
deemed punitive, rather than remedial, and the Supreme Court has indicated
that punitive awards are typically unavailable in equity.46 Returning to the
example above, even if the real harm to consumers exceeded $90 million—
for example, if the bank charged them overdraft fees—the most a court can
order through restitution is $90 million. Similarly, even if the company
realized more than $100 million in gains—for example, if it plowed these
profits into a successful marketing campaign—these additional gains are
generally not recoverable.
The Commission can also seek civil penalties.47 In contrast to equitable
remedies, civil penalties are intended to punish the wrongdoer, rather than
simply restore the status quo.48 They are calculated based on maximum penalty
amounts laid out by law, typically on a per-violation basis, rather than victims’
losses or wrongdoers’ gains.49 For example, under certain statutes the FTC
enforces, defendants can be liable for up to $43,280 per violation,50 which can
add up quickly for established corporate actors operating across the country.
45 See FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 931 (9th Cir. 2009) (defining restitution as the “full
amount lost by consumers,” regardless of profits); FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d 359, 372
(2d Cir. 2011) (defining disgorgement as “a method of forcing a defendant to give up the amount by
which he was unjustly enriched” (quoting SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90,
102 (2d Cir. 1978))).
46 See Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1942 (2020) (explaining that relief that exceeds profits was
not “typically available in equity”).
47 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(C).
48 Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1642 (2017).
49 Id.
50 See Press Release, FTC, FTC Publishes Inflation-Adjusted Civil Penalty Amounts (Jan. 13,
2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/01/ftc-publishes-inflation-adjusted-civil-
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Notably, to seek civil penalties under the FTC Act, the Commission must
typically refer complaints to the Attorney General, who can file a complaint
on behalf of the United States or return it to the Commission to pursue
independently.51 For ease of reference throughout this Article, it will be
assumed the Commission is litigating in its own name, though we discuss the
referral process further below.
B. Overview of FTC Tools
The remedies available to the Commission depend on the authorities the
Agency invokes. In this Section, each of the Commission’s primary
authorities will be discussed in turn, concluding with a discussion of the
FTC’s heavy reliance on § 13(b).
Under § 5(b) of the FTC Act, the Commission can initiate an
administrative proceeding to halt unfair or deceptive practices, unfair methods
of competition, or violations of other laws enforced through the FTC Act.52
Generally, only injunctive relief is available through § 5(b), and only through
a final order. Preliminary injunctions are not available, and monetary relief
cannot be awarded under current practice, except in a settlement.53
When the Commission’s administrative (as opposed to federal court)
orders have been violated, § 5(l) of the FTC Act authorizes the Commission
to seek injunctive relief, equitable monetary relief, and civil penalties in
federal court.54
Section 5(m) of the FTC Act also allows the Commission to seek civil
penalties in federal court. Section 5(m)(1)(A) allows the Commission to seek
civil penalties if a party has violated a Commission rule,55 while § 5(m)(1)(B)
allows the Commission to seek penalties against a party that engages in
conduct it knows has been determined to be unlawful in a Commission

penalty-amounts [https://perma.cc/U6GM-XXYW] (announcing that the maximum civil penalty
under a number of FTC authorities had risen to $43,280).
51 15 U.S.C. § 56.
52 15 U.S.C. § 45(b).
53 See Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321, 321-22 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding that the Commission could not
order redress in an administrative proceeding). However, the Commission can use other authorities in
tandem with § 5(b) to seek both preliminary and monetary relief in connection with administrative
litigation. See generally, A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative, Law Enforcement,
and Rulemaking Authority, FTC (May 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcementauthority [https://perma.cc/K2WH-KL6S].
54 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(l).
55 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A) authorizes penalties against persons, partnerships, or corporations
who engage in unfair or deceptive acts or practices “with actual knowledge or knowledge fairly
implied on the basis of objective circumstances that such act is unfair or deceptive and is prohibited
by such rule.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A).
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order.56 That latter authority, the Penalty Offense Authority, is the primary
focus of this Article.
Another key tool for the Commission is § 19 of the FTC Act.57 This
section of the FTC Act authorizes federal courts to order redress, notice,
other equitable relief, and damages.58 Section 19 can be invoked in two
circumstances. First, if the conduct violated a trade regulation rule, the
Commission can proceed directly to federal court to seek § 19 remedies.59
Second, if a reasonable person would consider the conduct at issue to be
dishonest or fraudulent, the Commission can seek relief through a two-step
process. The FTC must first conduct an administrative proceeding that leads
to a final order, and it can then proceed to federal court to seek further relief.60
Finally, for decades, § 13(b) of the FTC Act was seen as authorizing the
Commission to go directly to federal court to seek a wide range of remedies,
including preliminary and permanent injunctions, restitution, and
disgorgement.61 A key advantage of this interpretation of § 13(b) was that it
could be used to enforce “any provision of law enforced by the Federal Trade
Commission.”62 The flexibility this authority afforded the Commission was a
56 The final Commission order cannot be a consent order. Id. § 45(m)(1)(B). Although § 5(m)
does not explicitly authorize seeking equitable relief in such cases, § 16 of the FTC Act authorizes
the Commission to refer actions for equitable relief—in particular, actions under § 13(b) and § 19—
to the Attorney General. 15 U.S.C. § 56(a)(1). This means that if violators of a rule (in the case of
5(m)(1)(A) actions) or of a Commission finding (in the case of 5(m)(1)(B) actions) have also violated
the FTC Act, the Attorney General can, upon the FTC’s referral, seek equitable relief (including
monetary relief) in addition to civil penalties. See, e.g., Press Release, FTC, Debt Management
Telemarketers Settle FTC Charges (June 15, 2006), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2006/06/debt-management-telemarketers-settle-ftc-charges [https://perma.cc/RQ5C-YAK6]
(describing both the civil penalties and redress in an action filed by the United States).
57 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b).
58 Id.; Black’s Law Dictionary defines consequential damages as “[l]osses that do not flow
directly and immediately from an injurious act, but that result indirectly from the act.” Damages,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). We have been unable to identify a § 19 matter where the
FTC pursued damages, which is traditionally understood to be a legal remedy rather than an equitable
remedy. Unlike equitable relief, damages can conceivably capture a broad range of harms, including
indirect consequences of deception. As the FTC faces threats to its authority to seek equitable relief,
the Agency should consider pursuing this alternative form of relief in more cases.
59 See 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)(1) (“[T]he Commission may commence a civil action against such
person, partnership, or corporation for relief under subsection (b) in a United States district court
or in any court of competent jurisdiction of a State.”).
60 See 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)(2).
61 Specifically, the second proviso of § 13(b) authorizes the FTC to seek, and district courts to
grant “a permanent injunction” without the FTC’s initiating administrative proceedings. See FTC v.
H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1982); FTC v. U.S. Oil & Gas Corp., 748 F.2d 1431,
1434-35 (11th Cir. 1984). Once their equitable authority is invoked, district courts may employ their
inherent powers to grant preliminary equitable relief (such as asset freezes) and permanent relief,
including equitable monetary relief. U.S. Oil & Gas, 748 F.2d at 1434-35; FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp.,
87 F.3d 466, 468-69 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that a full range of equitable remedies are available).
62 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
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key reason the Agency came to rely on it overwhelmingly when seeking relief
in federal court. However, as discussed in the next Section, the Agency’s
powers under this provision were recently vitiated by the Supreme Court.
Table 1: Overview of Federal Trade Commission Act Authorities to Seek
Monetary Relief63

Authority

Description

13(b)

For violations of any law enforced
by
the
Commission,
the
Commission may, on its own
accord, seek injunctions and other
equitable relief in federal court

19(a)(1),
19(b)

For violations of any rule defining
an unfair or deceptive act or
practice, the Commission may, on
its own accord, commence a civil
action in federal court
For violations of the Act’s
prohibition on unfair or deceptive
acts or practices, the Commission
can enter a final cease and desist
order condemning the act or
practice in question. After the
Commission enters the final order,
the Commission may, on its own
accord, commence a civil action in
federal court, so long as the
conduct would
have
been
reasonably known to be “dishonest
or fraudulent”
For violations of any final cease and
desist order entered by the
Commission, the Commission may

19(a)(2),
19(b)

5(l)

Remedies
Available
Until
AMG,
Restitution,
Disgorgement
of Ill-Gotten
Gains, Other
Equitable
Relief

Restitution,
Other
Equitable
Relief,
Damages

Civil Penalties,
Restitution,
Disgorgement,

63 This excludes authorities specifically authorized by other statutes subject to FTC
enforcement. Some statutes enumerate conduct that should be treated as rule violations under the
FTC Act. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(c); 15 U.S.C. § 6502(c); 15 U.S.C. § 45b(d)(1).

2021]

85

Resurrecting the Penalty Offense Authority

5(m)(1)(A)

5(m)(1)(B)

refer a complaint for civil penalties
and other relief to the Attorney
General
For knowing violations of any trade
regulation rule, the Commission
may refer a complaint for civil
penalties to the Attorney General
For non-parties that knowingly
violate litigated final orders, the
Commission may refer a complaint
for civil penalties to the Attorney
General

Other
Equitable
Relief

Civil Penalties

C. The Commission’s Reliance on § 13(b)
While the Commission retains a number of avenues to pursue monetary
relief, since the 1980s the Agency has relied overwhelmingly on § 13(b).64 As
noted above, § 13(b) offered certain advantages over other enforcement routes.
Whenever the Commission had reason to believe a party is violating or is about
to violate the law, the Commission could go to federal court independently to
seek both preliminary relief—including temporary restraining orders, asset
freezes, and the appointment of receivers—and permanent relief, including
injunctions and orders of disgorgement and restitution.
When the Commission has not used § 13(b), it generally relies on § 5(b)—
the Commission’s authority to seek and to issue administrative cease-anddesist orders.65
Annual statistics compiled by the Commission reveal the Agency’s heavily
historic reliance on § 13(b) and administrative lawsuits. In 2018, according to
our analysis, nearly eighty-eight percent of the Commission’s consumer
protection lawsuits were brought either through § 13(b) or the Commission’s
administrative forum, and the Commission did not obtain monetary relief in

64
65

See infra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 45(b).
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any of the administrative actions.66 This has been a consistent pattern in
recent history, spanning multiple Commissions.67
While the Commission came to rely overwhelmingly on § 13(b), that
reliance now leaves the Agency exposed. In April, the Supreme Court held
unanimously that § 13(b) does not authorize the Commission to seek
equitable monetary relief in federal court, overruling decades of circuit
precedent.68 In addition, in 2019, the Third Circuit held that the Commission
must show defendants are violating or about to violate the law in order to
invoke § 13(b).69 This means that for misconduct that has ceased, the
Commission may be unable even to seek an injunction through § 13(b).
Section 13(b) has been a vital tool for the Commission, and the Supreme
Court’s decision is a major loss. However, even before this decision was issued,
the Commission’s overreliance on § 13(b) carried serious drawbacks.
II. Drawbacks of Overreliance on § 13(b)
While the Commission’s ability to seek monetary relief through § 13(b)
has now been stripped, the problems with the Commission’s historic reliance
on this authority go well beyond adverse decisions by certain federal courts.
As Congress considers restoring the Commission’s equitable authorities
under § 13(b), it is important to recognize the drawbacks of relying on these
authorities alone.
In particular, because § 13(b) allowed the Commission to seek restitution
and disgorgement rather than penalties or damages, it proved to be an
imperfect tool, particularly in two types of circumstances. The first is where
66 To conduct this analysis, the number of federal actions—where § 13(b) is invoked—plus the
number of administrative actions were divided by the total number of actions. See Stats & Data 2018,
FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/reports/annual-highlights-2018/stats-and-data [https://perma.cc/3W4HFGFH] (noting that the Commission filed 40 federal court actions, 18 administrative actions, and 8
actions to seek civil penalties). For other annual reports, see FTC Annual Reports, FTC, https://
www.ftc.gov/policy/reports/policy-reports/ftc-annual-reports [https://perma.cc/8AGL-WPQV].
67 According to our analysis, over the last five years, nearly ninety percent of the Agency’s actions
were brought under § 13(b) or § 5(b). See Stats & Data 2019, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/reports/annualhighlights-2019/stats-and-data [https://perma.cc/3G72-ENRL]; Stats & Data 2018, FTC,
https://www.ftc.gov/reports/annual-highlights-2018/stats-and-data [https://perma.cc/3W4H-FGFH];
Stats & Data 2017, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/reports/annual-highlights-2017/stats-and-data [https://
perma.cc/8P2H-SDPK]; Stats & Data 2016, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/node/1205233 [https://
perma.cc/V3BU-UJQS]; Stats & Data 2015, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/node/943403 [https://perma.cc/
DQY7-JPJ5]. This trend appears to have begun in the 1980s, when the Commission launched its 13(b)
program targeting fraud. Kirkpatrick, supra note 3, at 77-78 (1989) (noting that § 13(b) had become the
“foundation of the Commission’s consumer fraud program”).
68 AMG v. FTC, 141 S. Ct. 1341, 1344 (2021).
69 See, e.g., FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc., 917 F.3d 147, 150, 161 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that
under § 13(b), the FTC must show defendants are about to violate the law).
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the degree of harm or ill-gotten revenue is subject to dispute. The second is
where misconduct is so harmful and distortionary to consumers and
competitors that equitable relief is unlikely to deter other wrongdoers or
provide adequate relief to victims. Under those circumstances, described
further below, § 13(b) has proven to be a poor fit for correcting and deterring
widespread harms.
A. Hard-to-Quantify Harm
Section 13(b) of the FTC Act does not expressly address monetary relief,
nor does it offer guidance on how such relief should be quantified. Rather, it
authorizes the Commission to seek permanent injunctions, which until AMG,
was seen as also allowing courts to award ancillary relief such as restitution
and disgorgement. How these remedies are calculated has been shaped by
decades of precedent.
Many of the Commission’s earliest cases brought under § 13(b) involved
defendants engaged in routine frauds—often, the equivalent to criminal
theft—so in the years before AMG, those cases have shaped how courts
calculate and award monetary relief in cases brought through 13(b).70
As a general matter, early case law held that to seek monetary relief under
§ 13(b), it was the Commission’s initial burden to approximate harm or unjust
gains.71 However, district courts could use gross receipts (i.e., the total
revenue earned in connection with the wrongful practices) as a starting point
in most circumstances, while allowing defendants to submit evidence that

70 See generally J. Howard Beales III & Timothy J. Muris, Striking the Proper Balance: Redress
Under Section 13(B) of the FTC Act, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2013) [hereinafter Beales & Muris]
(describing the early origins of the Commission’s 13(b) fraud program).
71 Id. at 22-28.
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would reduce that award.72 Generally speaking, the value of a product
received was not subtracted from consumer redress.73
This can be an effective formula for seeking monetary relief in cases
involving conduct that amounts to criminal theft, where consumers receive
nothing of value. However, the Commission encountered difficulty in cases
involving companies that sell products or services that have some use or
value.74 Although the early 13(b) case law suggested that seeking full redress
may be appropriate even in cases involving products of value, well-resourced
companies can mount aggressive challenges to the Commission’s
approximation. For example, a common tactic was to retain high-priced
72 Gross receipts can be a starting point for restitution or disgorgement orders once the
Commission establishes a presumption of reliance. The Commission need not prove consumer
reliance in order to obtain monetary relief for consumers. Rather, it is “entitled to a presumption of
consumer reliance” by showing that “(1) the defendant made material misrepresentations or
omissions that ‘were of a kind usually relied upon by reasonable prudent persons;’ (2) the
misrepresentations or omissions were widely disseminated; and (3) consumers actually purchased
the defendants’ products.” FTC v. BlueHippo Funding, LLC, 762 F.3d 238, 244 (2d Cir. 2014); see
also FTC v. Kuykendall, 371 F.3d 745, 765-66 (10th Cir. 2004) (“When, however, the FTC has shown
through clear and convincing evidence that defendants were engaged in a pattern or practice of
contemptuous conduct, the district court may use the defendants’ gross receipts as a starting point
for assessing sanctions.”); FTC v. Figgie Int’l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 605-06 (9th Cir. 1993) (“A
presumption of actual reliance arises once the Commission has proved that the defendant made
material misrepresentations, that they were widely disseminated, and that consumers purchased the
defendant’s product.”); FTC v. Sec. Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1316 (8th Cir. 1991)
(“To satisfy the reliance requirement . . . the FTC need merely show that the misrepresentations or
omissions were of a kind usually relied upon by reasonable and prudent persons, that they were
widely disseminated, and that the injured consumers actually purchased the defendant’s products.”).
Once a presumption of reliance has been established, the Commission has the burden of making a
reasonable approximation of monetary relief. FTC v. Bronson Partners, 654 F.3d 359, 368 (2d Cir.
2011) (“[A] two-step burden-shifting framework for calculating monetary relief under section
13(b). . . . requires the FTC to first ‘show that its calculations reasonably approximated the amount
of the defendant[s’] unjust gains,’ after which the burden shifts ‘to the defendants to show that those
figures were inaccurate.’” (citation omitted)). Under those circumstances, the starting point for
calculating relief is generally total revenue. Figgie Int’l, Inc., 994 F.2d at 606 (holding that the proper
amount of monetary relief is total revenue); Kuykendall, 371 F.3d at 764 (when awarding redress, “the
district court may use the defendants’ gross receipts as a starting point”).
73 See Kuykendall, 371 F.3d at 766 (rejecting efforts to offset gross receipts by the value of the
products deceptively sold); FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 674 F. Supp. 2d 373, 386 (D. Conn.
2009) (rejecting efforts to offset any “intrinsic value” consumers received from a deceptively sold
weight loss product), aff ’d, 654 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 2011).
74 See Statement of Chairman Joseph J. Simons and Commissioners Noah Joshua Phillips and
Christine S. Wilson, Sunday Riley Modern Skincare, LLC, FTC File No. 192-3008, 2020 WL
6589813 (F.T.C.), at *1 (Oct. 21, 2019) [hereinafter Simons Statement], https://www.ftc.gov/system/
files/documents/cases/2020.11.6_sunday_riley_majority_statement_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9F3VR2K] (“In some cases, such as frauds where the consumer receives no value, this calculation [of illgotten gains] may be obvious. In others, including Sunday Riley, a legally defensible calculation of
ill-gotten gains may be difficult. In such cases, the expenditure of resources needed to develop an
adequate evidentiary basis reasonably to approximate ill-gotten gains may substantially outweigh
any benefits to consumers and the market.”).
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experts to conduct “independent” surveys that show little consumer harm.75
This forces the Commission to substantiate its estimate with its own expert
analysis, and it can expose the Commission to substantial costs and risks.76
Battles over approximating harm are likely to continue even if Congress
restores the Commission’s § 13(b) authority.
Because of the difficulty of approximating harm, the Commission has
historically been reluctant to seek monetary relief in cases where the Agency
anticipates the wrongdoing firm(s) would challenge the government’s
approximation of harm.77 On some occasions, the Commission has proceeded
anyway—bringing 13(b) actions against well-heeled firms even when the
outcome is uncertain.78 This has sent a strong message that no firm is above
the law.
But in a number of areas where harm was seen as difficult to quantify, the
Commission has instead resorted to no-money settlements. These
settlements systematically undervalue harm and underdeter wrongdoing, but
the Commission often views them as preferable to a 13(b) action, which can
open the door to costly disputes over approximation of harm.
For example, in cases involving false labeling of otherwise functional
products, the Commission—until very recently—has typically turned to nomoney settlements where the wrongdoer pays nothing.79 This is also a
frequent problem in the FTC’s privacy and data security programs, where
the vast majority of cases against first-time offenders impose no monetary
judgment whatsoever. This is true even in cases of unambiguous harm, such
as where valuable data has been stolen, or distortions to the market, such as
when enterprises secure contracts by misrepresenting their data security or
privacy practices.80 Finally, underdeterrence is a growing problem in the
75 See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Pom Wonderful v. FTC, 136 S. Ct. 1839, app. at 124
(2016) (No. 15-525); ECM Bio Films, Inc., No: 9358, 2014 WL 5298214 (F.T.C.), at *24-25, *40-43
(Sept. 30, 2014) (Complaint Counsel’s Proposed Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law).
76 See Beales & Muris, supra note 70, at 40 (analyzing the risks to the 13(b) program in nonfraud cases).
77 See, e.g., Simons Statement, supra note 74.
78 See, e.g., Press Release, FTC, FTC Alleges Fuel Card Marketer FleetCor Charged Hundreds
of Millions in Hidden Fees (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/
12/ftc-alleges-fuel-card-marketer-fleetcor-charged-hundreds-millions [https://perma.cc/78GE-E78G]
(challenging alleged violations by a major fuel card marketer and its CEO).
79 See, e.g., Sandpiper of Cal., Inc., No. C-4675, 2019 WL 1786666 (F.T.C.) (Apr. 16, 2019)
(reaching a no-money settlement against a seller of military-themed backpacks falsely branded Made
in USA); Moonlight Slumber, LLC, No. C-4634, 2017 WL 6507202 (F.T.C.) (Dec. 11, 2017)
(reaching a no-money settlement against a seller of mattresses falsely marketed as organic).
80 See, e.g., NTT Global Data Centers Americas, Inc., No. 9386, 2020 WL 3819197 (F.T.C.)
(June 30, 2020) (settling with NTT Global Data Centers for $0 in spite of evidence that the company
obtained contracts based on false privacy promises); Facebook, Inc., No. C-4365, 2012 FTC LEXIS
135 (July 27, 2012) (settling with Facebook for $0 following alleged privacy violations); Google Inc.,
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Agency’s approach to combatting ills in e-commerce, where the Commission
has sought no-money settlements even in cases of egregious fake review
fraud, which deeply distorts markets and enables other harms.81
No-money settlements against established corporate actors seriously
impair the Commission’s credibility. The Agency’s most important, market
moving cases involve established corporate actors, not fly-by-night scammers.
Obtaining monetary relief in these cases is critical to not only making victims
whole but also changing incentives around breaking the law.82 Practices like
generating fake reviews or mislabeling products “Made in USA” can be highly
profitable, and settlements that allow wrongdoers to retain these profits do
almost nothing to deter other firms from engaging in the same misconduct.83
Indeed, as discussed further in the next Section, congressional frustration
with “slap on the wrist” settlements that simply order a wrongdoer to stop
breaking the law is a key reason why the Commission was given additional
authority to seek monetary relief in these cases.84
To be clear, before AMG, the Commission was able to deploy § 13(b) to
obtain robust monetary relief even in cases where the harm or gain was
difficult to quantify, and even where the defendant was an established

No. C-4336, 2011 FTC LEXIS 251 (Oct. 13, 2011) (settling with Google for $0 following alleged
privacy violations).
81 See Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra Joined by Commissioner Rebecca Kelly
Slaughter, Sunday Riley, FTC File No. 1923008, 2019 WL 5455466 (F.T.C.), at *2 (Oct. 21, 2019)
[hereinafter Sunday Riley Statement], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/
1550127/192_3008_final_rc_statement_on_sunday_riley.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9VB-7VVZ] (arguing
that a no-money order is unlikely to deter other actors from using fake reviews to boost sales and
cheat competitors).
82 For example, the FTC recently recovered $40 million from a major payment processor
accused of facilitating fraud that cost victims millions. See Press Release, FTC, Worldwide Payment
Processor and Payments Industry Executive to Pay $40.2 Million to Settle FTC Charges of Assisting
Fraudulent Schemes and Credit Card Laundering (May 19, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2020/05/worldwide-payment-processor-payments-industry-executive-pay402 [https://perma.cc/6LRP-GXRS] (announcing a $40.2 million settlement from First Data
Merchant Services, LLC). This recovery will help make those victims whole, while sending the
whole industry a message that facilitating fraud is illegal and costly. See Ellen T. Berge, Leonard L.
Gordon & Katelyn J. Patton, Latest FTC Payment Processing Case Results in $40 Million Proposed
Judgment and ISO Oversight Requirements, ALL ABOUT ADVERTISING L. (May 20, 2020),
https://www.allaboutadvertisinglaw.com/2020/05/latest-ftc-payment-processing-case-results-in-40million-proposed-judgment-and-iso-oversight-requirements.html [https://perma.cc/2X3L-YBT4]
(warning other payment processors to examine the settlement carefully).
83 Professor David Vladeck, who led the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection from 2009 to
2012, has explained the importance of seeking redress in deception cases, arguing that “giving
companies—‘reputable’ or not—one free pass at deceptive advertising is fundamentally at odds with
the Commission’s consumer protection mandate . . . .” David C. Vladeck, Charting the Course: The
Federal Trade Commission’s Second Hundred Years, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2101, 2116-17 (2015).
84 No-money orders can be appropriate in cases involving novel forms of misconduct, but none
of the misconduct described here is novel. See infra Part IV.
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corporate actor.85 But, because this often involved a substantial investment of
resources, especially against a well-financed actor, the Agency has often
turned to no-money administrative settlements—a problem likely to persist
even if the Commission’s § 13(b) powers are restored. As discussed further in
the next Section, this approach ignores other tools in the Commission’s
toolbox.
B. Harm that Exceeds Direct Gains or Losses
The Commission’s overreliance on § 13(b) has also been problematic when
the misconduct at issue cannot be meaningfully remedied through equitable
relief. As discussed in the preceding Section, if a swindler steals $1 million,
the most the Commission generally could compel the swindler to pay under
§ 13(b) is $1 million. This limitation undermines deterrence and sells victims
short. For would-be swindlers, even before AMG, the worst consequence they
could face if caught is being forced to return their earnings—hardly a strong
deterrent.86 And for victims, the collateral consequences of deceit—such as
additional medical care required when a treatment does not work as
promised—cannot be recovered at all.
This logic applies not only to small-time scams but also to corporate
crime. Certain forms of lawbreaking are either so profitable for wrongdoers
or so harmful to victims that equitable monetary relief, especially when it is
not paired with sufficient injunctive relief, is grossly insufficient to correct
the market distortion and deter other lawbreaking. This occurs frequently in
opportunity schemes, where the losses or gains cannot be measured simply
by how much the victims are paying the perpetrators.
Opportunity schemes involve the sale of money-making opportunities, as
opposed to products or services. For example, in certain multilevel marketing
(MLM) programs, would-be participants are promised large incomes if they
85 For example, in a recent settlement with Williams Sonoma, which was accused of
disseminating false Made in USA claims, the FTC was able—using its equitable authority—to
secure $1 million for affected consumers. See Press Release, FTC, FTC Approves Final Order
Settling Charges that Williams-Sonoma, Inc. Made Overly Broad and Misleading ‘Made in USA’
Claims About Houseware and Furniture Products (July 16, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2020/07/ftc-approves-final-order-settling-charges-williams-sonoma-inc
[https://perma.cc/Z4CE-CPL9]. This settlement resolved allegations first exposed publicly by
TINA.org. See Press Release, Truth In Advertising.org, Williams-Sonoma to Pay $1 Million to Settle
Deceptive Ad Lawsuit Sparked by TINA.org (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.truthinadvertising.org/
williams-sonoma-to-pay-one-million-to-settle-deceptive-ad-lawsuit-sparked-by-tina-org
[https://perma.cc/SN7M-HU8R].
86 See generally Alex Raskolnikov, Deterrence Theory: Key Findings and Challenges, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF COMPLIANCE 179-92 (Benjamin van Rooij & D. Daniel Sokol, eds.
2021). For an early discussion of deterrence, see Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
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enlist as salespeople. If these promises prove hollow, their losses can go far
beyond what they paid into the scheme, especially if they pursued the
opportunity full time, or took out loans to finance product purchases.87
Franchises and gig economy networks can engage in similar forms of
deceit, tricking would-be franchisees or gig workers with deceptive earnings
claims that can lure them into programs that sap their savings, harm their
credit, and deprive them of better opportunities.88 This same dynamic can
occur in for-profit colleges, where unscrupulous schools will promise a major
earnings boost to lure students, only to leave these students with crushing
debt, wrecked credit, and lost time.89
In cases like these, § 13(b) proved to be an inadequate tool, even when the
FTC used it effectively.90 First, the Commission faced the problem already
discussed—any estimate of harm in these matters can be challenged,
especially in cases, such as those involving the gig economy, where the victims
did not actually pay the wrongdoers.91 But these cases involved the additional
problem that even one hundred percent disgorgement was likely insufficient.
Disgorgement and restitution, unlike legal damages, cover only direct losses
or gains—not the collateral consequences of deceit. These consequences, both
87 See Consumer Information: Multi-Level Marketing Businesses and Pyramid Schemes, FTC (May
2021), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0065-multi-level-marketing-businesses-and-pyramidschemes [https://perma.cc/9TYK-BKYB] (noting that in illegal pyramid schemes, participants
typically “lose everything they invest” and may end up “deeply in debt”).
88 For example, in recent years Quiznos’ franchisees have accused the brand of a host of abuses,
particularly after revenue in the system began to plummet. See Jonathan Maze, A Brief History of
Quiznos’ Collapse, RESTAURANT BUS. (June 13, 2018), https://www.restaurantbusinessonline.com/
financing/brief-history-quiznos-collapse [https://perma.cc/24NE-EJHN] (describing the business
practices that limited franchisees’ profits).
89 See, e.g., Jessica Glenza, The Rise and Fall of Corinthian Colleges and the Wake of Debt It Left
Behind, THE GUARDIAN (July 28, 2014, 3:57 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/education/2014/
jul/28/corinthian-colleges-for-profit-education-debt-investigation [https://perma.cc/ZPC9-6TBK]
(noting that students could be left in debt with credits that are unlikely to transfer); Danielle
Douglass-Gabriel, Feds Found Widespread Fraud at Corinthian Colleges. Why are Students Still Paying
the Price?, WASH. POST. (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/
2016/09/29/feds-found-widespread-fraud-at-corinthian-colleges-why-are-students-still-paying-theprice [https://perma.cc/7YJ5-5JKB] (noting that nearly 80,000 Corinthian College students are
facing debt collection).
90 See, e.g., Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra Regarding the Deception of Delivery
Drivers by Amazon.com, FTC File No. 1923123, 2021 WL 489843 (F.T.C.), at *2, https://
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1587003/20200102_final_rchopra_
statement_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ATD-EEXU] (“[P]reying on workers justifies punitive
measures far beyond the restitution provided here, and I believe the FTC should act now to deploy
dormant authorities to trigger civil penalties and other relief in cases like this one.”).
91 For example, the FTC’s 2017 charges against Uber regarding false earnings claims to drivers
generated controversy over the appropriate estimation of ill-gotten gains. See Dissenting Statement
of Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Uber, Inc., FTC File No. 1523082, 2017 WL 395526
(F.T.C.), at *1-2 (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/
1054973/uber_statement_of_commissioner_ohlhausen.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RPH-NLAH].
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for the victim and perpetrator, can far exceed what the Commission can
recover, even if its equitable authority is restored.
In addition to the harm to victims described above, wrongdoers can realize
powerful gains. Gig economy firms can achieve network effects, multi-level
marketing distributors can recruit more distributors to increase their
“downline,” and for-profit colleges can plow federal aid dollars back into
marketing to recruit more students. Orders that simply require wrongdoers
to return their direct profits are unlikely to deter these practices market-wide,
and the result is that the Commission continues to target practices—false
earnings claims in particular—that it has been battling for decades, only to
see this same misconduct recur year after year.92
III. Advantages of the Penalty Offense Authority under § 5(m)(1)(B)
Section 5(m)(1)(B) of the FTC Act—the Penalty Offense Authority—is
a unique authority with unique requirements, and considerable promise. In
this Part, we sketch out how the Commission originally used this authority
to tackle market-wide harms, only to largely abandon it as the Agency shifted
its focus to shutting down scams. We then detail three key advantages of the
Penalty Offense Authority relative to § 13(b): more effective deterrence,
lessened litigation risk, and greater market-wide impact.
A. Background on the Penalty Offense Authority
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Congress and others became concerned
that the FTC was addressing wrongful conduct through inadequate
resolutions. The Commission’s orders halted unfair or deceptive conduct, but
violators did not forfeit profits or compensate victims. A landmark 1969
American Bar Association Report, for example, found serious inadequacies in

92 For example, more than 40 years ago, the Commission found that, in the for-profit college
sector, the Agency’s “case-by-case adjudication was not achieving the requisite prophylactic effect.”
FTC, PROPRIETARY VOCATIONAL AND HOME STUDY SCHOOLS: FINAL REPORT TO THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND PROPOSED TRADE REGULATION RULE (16 CFR PART 438),
at 19 (1976), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED134790.pdf [https://perma.cc/SE2Z-XBTH].
History has borne this out. Four years after that report was issued, the Commission sued Bell &
Howell Company, then the parent of DeVry, for misleading students about their likelihood of
obtaining employment after graduation. See Bell & Howell Co., 95 F.T.C. 761, 762 (1980) (describing
in its complaint that DeVry had been marketing resident training and home study courses with
misleading claims about employment prospects). Decades later, the Commission charged the same
school with the same misconduct. See Press Release, FTC, DeVry University Agrees to $100 Million
Settlement with FTC (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/12/devryuniversity-agrees-100-million-settlement-ftc [https://perma.cc/SE2Z-XBTH].
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the FTC’s consumer enforcement program,93 findings that echoed those of
another influential report by Ralph Nader.94 The Commission’s no-money
cease-and-desist orders were harshly criticized. Robert Pitofsky, the FTC’s
future Chairman, referred to these orders as “scandalously weak.”95 Congress
also found these orders inadequate. Senator Warren Magnuson called them
“a slap of the violator’s wrist,”96 and Representative John E. Moss argued that
they were “clearly inadequate” when rules have been violated.97 In 1975, this
dissatisfaction contributed to the enactment of the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act.98
In addition to reaffirming the Commission’s rulemaking powers, the
Magnuson-Moss Act gave the Commission extensive new authorities to seek
redress for consumers and civil penalties against persons who violate FTC
rules or who knowingly engage in practices that the FTC has previously
determined were unfair or deceptive. This final authority is codified in §
5(m)(1)(B) of the FTC Act, the Penalty Offense Authority.99

93 See ABA, REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION 1 (1969) (finding that the FTC had mismanaged its resources and showed a downward
trend in virtually all categories analyzed).
94 See generally EDWARD COX, ROBERT FELLMETH & JOHN SCHULZ, THE CONSUMER AND
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONSUMER PROTECTION RECORD
OF THE FTC (1969).
95 Irving Scher, Gerald P. Norton, Caswell O. Hobbs, III, Robert Pitofsky & Victor H.
Kramer, Part II—FTC Improvement Act, 45 ANTITRUST L.J. 96, 117 (1976). Pitofsky continued:
“Businessmen engaged in fraudulent practices knew in advance that the worst that could happen to
them in most cases would be that if a fraud were detected, and if the Commission decided to proceed
against that company as opposed to hundreds of other companies engaged in similar practices, and
if the complaint ever proceeded to a conclusion, they would then be asked to discontinue the
practice. In effect, the most significant deterrent to engaging in fraudulent practices in those days
was the considerable lawyers’ fees that would be generated by a Commission investigation.” Id.
96 119 CONG. REC. 29,480 (1973) (statement of Sen. Warren Magnuson). “A mere cease-anddesist order,” Sen. Magnuson added, “has frequently let a wrongdoer keep his ill-gotten gains.” Id.
97 120 CONG. REC. 31,735 (1974) (statement of Rep. John E. Moss). Representative Robert C.
Eckhardt added that the Administration was committed to making “consumer fraud pursuable,
punishable, and profitless,” and that the Commission needed expanded authority to ensure this. 120
CONG. REC. 31,735 (1974) (statement of Rep. Robert C. Eckhardt).
98 See generally Beales & Muris, supra note 70, at 8-21 (describing the legislative history).
99 As noted, § 5(m)(1)(B) was added to the FTC Act by section 205 of the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty-FTC Improvement Act. Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975). In 1994, § 5(m)(1)(B)
was amended to clarify that defendants could challenge de novo the FTC’s underlying
determination that a practice was unfair or deception. Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-312, 108 Stat 1691 (1994).
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Under the Penalty Offense Authority, the Commission can seek civil
penalties against violators of Commission orders if:
• The Commission has issued a final cease and desist order, other
than a consent order, following an administrative proceeding
under § 5(b) of the FTC Act;100 and
• The Commission has determined in that order that a particular
practice is unfair or deceptive and therefore unlawful;101 and
• A party has engaged in that practice after the Commission’s
cease-and-desist order became final, with actual knowledge that
the practice is unfair or deceptive.102
In other words, when parties are on notice that the Commission has
condemned certain practices in a litigated final order,103 these practices can
become “penalty offenses”—offenses that carry with them the threat of
significant civil penalties.104
The Penalty Offense Authority does not detail how actual knowledge can
be established. In certain instances, actual knowledge can potentially be
imputed based on admissions or other evidence.105 However, one
unambiguous way to trigger penalty liability is to apprise parties of the
Commission’s prior determinations, which then exposes them to penalty
liability if they engage in similar practices. These practices then become
penalty offenses with respect to those on notice.
Importantly, there is no statute of limitations on previous Commission
findings. That is, even if the Commission determined decades ago that a
practice is deceptive, that practice can become a penalty offense for
companies on notice of the Commission’s determination, regardless of when
the determination was made.106
The Penalty Offense Authority includes particularly strong due process
protections for defendants. First and most significantly, parties cannot be
held liable unless they are shown to have had actual knowledge of the

15 U.S.C. § 45(b).
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B).
A default order may also trigger liability under § 5(m)(1)(B).
When the Commission seeks civil penalties, both parties have the right to demand a jury
to determine whether a violation has occurred. See United States v. J. B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414,
423-30 (2d Cir. 1974) (noting that the defendant had the right to have a jury summoned and
summarizing many cases that had reached similar conclusions).
105 For example, we have seen entities under FTC investigation tout the fact that they are
aware of previous FTC orders relating to the subject of the investigation. See, e.g., DIRECT SELLING
ASSOC., LEGITIMATE DIRECT SELLING VS. ILLEGAL PYRAMID SCHEMES, https://www.dsa.org/
docs/default-source/ethics/internalconsumptionwhitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5YF-9R4A].
106 See, e.g., FTC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 81-503, 1983 WL 1889, at *3 (D. Colo. Oct. 18, 1983)
(stating that orders issued before the codification of § 5(m)(1)(B) can trigger penalty liability).
100
101
102
103
104
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Commission’s determination—the most exacting knowledge standard found
anywhere in the FTC Act.107 In addition, even if actual knowledge can be
shown, parties are entitled under the authority to a de novo hearing on any
issues of fact, including on whether their conduct is sufficiently similar to that
which was previously condemned.108 Finally, and exceptionally, defendants in
penalty offense actions can challenge the Commission’s prior determination
that such conduct was unlawful, thereby forcing the Commission to both
defend its prior determination and demonstrate that its findings can be
applied to distinct facts.109
As discussed further below, the Penalty Offense Authority has been used
rarely over the last four decades. As a result, there is limited case law
analyzing these due process protections.110 In our view, it is particularly
important to ensure that any action under this section involves conduct that
is sufficiently related to the prior conduct condemned by the Commission,
and that this prior condemnation remains appropriate.111 However parties
need not rely solely on prosecutorial discretion, as the authority’s defendantfriendly protections provide strong guardrails against inappropriate use.
The addition of this tool to the FTC’s arsenal was expected to have a
significant impact. Miles Kirkpatrick, who led the ABA Committee that
highlighted the ineffectiveness of the Commission in 1969, and who would
later become the Agency’s chairman, suggested that § 5(m)(1)(B) be named
the “instant penalty” section.112 Others described this new power as the
Commission’s “unsprung bear trap,” and one commentator suggested that the
Commission begin proactively incorporating the program into future
administrative complaints.113
15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B)(2).
15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(2).
Id.
Two litigated decisions are worth noting. In 1982, a federal court rejected a challenge to the
statute’s constitutionality, while recognizing—this right was codified—that defendants can challenge
the Commission’s prior legal determinations. United States v. Allied Publishers Serv., Inc., 1982-83
Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 64,983, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 1982). In addition, in 1988, a federal court found that
prior Commission orders could trigger penalties only if the Commission specifically determined
that a practice was unfair or deceptive. United States v. Hopkins Dodge, Inc., 849 F.2d 311, 314 (8th
Cir. 1988).
111 One of the few decisions analyzing this authority rejected the argument that the
Commission’s earlier determinations were overly broad to bind the defendants. In 1978, the
Commission issued synopses stating that it was unlawful to “falsely represent the filling content of
down products[,] . . . affix false and inaccurate labels concerning the filling content of down
products[, or] . . . falsely represent in advertising, the filling contents of down products.” Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 1983 WL 1889, at *3. The court found that the practices condemned were sufficiently
particular to bind the company. Id. at *4.
112 Miles W. Kirkpatrick, Introductory Remarks, Title II of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty—
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 509, 511-12 (1975).
113 Scher et al., supra note 95, at 113-15.
107
108
109
110
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After securing this new authority in 1975, the FTC began to deploy it. As
detailed in internal Commission records, the Commission established a task
force in 1975 to review its new authority and make recommendations on how
to apply it.114 Of particular interest to the task force was how to establish that
firms had “actual knowledge” that certain practices had been condemned by
the Commission—a necessary predicate for establishing liability.115 The task
force recommended that the Commission serve companies with a “synopsis”
of applicable Commission case law, along with the cases themselves.116 While
this notification is not a legal requirement, it was a clear way to establish
knowledge, and the recommendation was accepted.117
In 1976, the Commission launched a pilot program in which it formally
notified dozens of businesses about Agency orders declaring that specific
practices were unlawful.118 The notices warned the corporate recipients that
if they violated the terms of those orders, they could be subject to civil
penalties.119 The Commission then conducted follow-up investigations to
determine whether such firms continued to engage in unfair and deceptive
practices, and in 1977, the Commission announced its first civil penalty
actions under this program.120
During this period, according to internal records, Penalty Offense
Authority notifications were disseminated to market participants in a number
of industries, including auto rental, franchises, general business
opportunities, and cosmetics.121 The Commission also targeted marketing and
advertising tactics, including door-to-door sales, endorsements, energy
savings claims, and truth in lending.122
The Commission used the Penalty Offense Authority to target whole
industries, problems in certain geographic areas, and the largest corporations
of the era, such as Sears Roebuck.123 Within five years, according to internal
records, the Commission had sent notifications to over 2000 firms.124
Commissioner Patricia Bailey, reflecting in 1982 on the Agency’s early use of
the authority, called it “an extremely effective and efficient way to enforce the
This is based on the authors’ review of internal FTC memos that are in custody of the FTC.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See David O. Bickart, Civil Penalties Under Section 5(m) of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
44 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 768 (1976) (describing the FTC’s early use of their authority to enforce the
civil penalty provisions).
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 See supra note 114.
122 Id.
123 FTC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 81-503, 1983 WL 1889, at *1 (D. Colo. Oct. 18, 1983).
124 See supra note 114.
114
115
116
117
118
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law,” and one that furthered the Commission’s ability to protect “not only
consumers, but also honest business.” 125
Despite this early momentum, the use of the authority fell dramatically
in the 1980s. As noted earlier, the Commission shifted its priorities away from
systemic market problems and toward small-time scams during this period,
and § 13(b) became the Agency favored tool to shut them down.126
Over the last decade, the Penalty Offense Authority has been used only
once. In the late 2000s, the Commission began uncovering widespread
deception around the sale of “bamboo” textile products that were in fact made
of rayon.127 Bamboo is seen as environmentally friendly, while manufacturing
rayon involves the use of harsh chemicals.128 Because rayon products are still
functional, seeking relief for consumers under § 13(b) may have been seen as
difficult, and the Commission initially challenged this deception without
seeking redress or disgorgement.129 Months later, however, the Commission
changed course, dialing up its enforcement program by serving dozens of
retailers with synopses of a previously litigated decision.130 That allowed the
Commission, in 2013, to announce settlements with four major retailers that
included civil penalties in addition to injunctive relief.131
B. Key Advantages of the Penalty Offense Authority over § 13(b)
Although the Commission has rarely deployed its Penalty Offense
Authority, doing so can offer three key advantages over seeking monetary
relief solely under § 13(b). First, the Authority allows the Commission to seek
125 Federal Trade Commission Reauthorization: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Com., Transp., &
Tourism of the H. Comm. on Energy & Com., 97th Cong. 138-39 (1982) (statement of Hon. Patricia P.
Bailey, Comm’r, Federal Trade Commission) [hereinafter Testimony of Commissioner Patricia P. Bailey
Before the H.R.].
126 See sources cited in supra note 3 and accompanying text.
127 See Press Release, FTC, FTC Warns 78 Retailers, Including Wal-Mart, Target, and Kmart,
to Stop Labeling and Advertising Rayon Textile Products as “Bamboo” (Feb. 3, 2010),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2010/02/ftc-warns-78-retailers-including-wal-marttarget-kmart-stop [https://perma.cc/NWJ5-S2QF] (“Seventy-eight companies nationwide have
received Federal Trade Commission letters warning that they may be breaking the law by selling
clothing and other textile products that are labeled and advertised as ‘bamboo,’ but actually are made
of manufactured rayon fiber.”).
128 Id.
129 See Press Release, FTC, FTC Charges Companies with ‘Bamboo-zling’ Consumers with
False Product Claims (Aug. 11, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2009/08/ftccharges-companies-bamboo-zling-consumers-false-product-claims [https://perma.cc/KN8Y-9TCA]
(announcing a no-money cease-and-desist order).
130 See Press Release, supra note 127.
131 Press Release, FTC, Four National Retailers Agree to Pay Penalties Totaling $1.26 Million
for Allegedly Falsely Labeling Textiles as Made of Bamboo, While They Actually Were Rayon (Jan.
3, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/01/four-national-retailers-agree-paypenalties-totaling-126-million [https://perma.cc/H4RK-8DAE].
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civil penalties, which unlike equitable relief can be calibrated to actually deter
wrongful conduct while promoting practices like self-reporting. Second,
particularly given the challenges before the Supreme Court, the Penalty
Offense Authority creates less litigation risk than 13(b). Finally, the Authority
is well suited to having a market-wide impact, which promotes widespread
compliance and saves taxpayer resources. Each of these advantages is
discussed in turn.
1. Deterrence
What distinguishes the Penalty Offense Authority from tools that authorize
(or authorized) equitable monetary relief, like § 13(b), is that the Penalty
Offense Authority authorizes the Agency to seek civil penalties. Penalties offer
a number of advantages over restitution or disgorgement available through §
13(b), particularly when it comes to effectuating general deterrence.
As discussed above, equitable relief under § 13(b) was awarded based on a
fairly rigid formula, according to which an award generally could not exceed
the amount directly lost by victims or earned by wrongdoers.132 This formula
can underdeter serious wrongdoing, especially when the consequences of that
wrongdoing are difficult to calculate, or far exceed direct losses or gains. In
fact, the Supreme Court has indicated that punitive remedies are not available
in equity.133
Unlike equitable relief, civil penalties are, by their nature, punitive. They
are intended not only to punish the wrongdoer but also to deter others from
engaging in similar misconduct.134 Because the likelihood of being caught by
a law enforcement agency is usually very low, basic deterrence theory
indicates that penalties on those who are caught must be severe. As one
economist put it, “[a] penalty intended to deter or influence economic
behavior should, at a minimum, be designed to remove the economic benefit

See supra Part II.
See Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1942 (2020) (explaining that relief that exceeds profits was
not “typically available in equity” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
134 See United States v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 232 (1975) (finding that penalties
under the FTC Act were intended to “provide a meaningful deterrence against violations”); see also
Paul Rubin, The Economics of Regulating Deception, 10 CATO J. 667, 684 (1991) (“Policies should . . .
be aimed at making sure that harmful acts do not pay.”); Colin S. Diver, The Assessment and
Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties by Federal Administrative Agencies, 79 C OLUM . L. R EV . 1435,
1464 (1979) (“The penalty for violating a regulation serves as a surrogate ‘cost’ of production
. . . . As such, its severity becomes as much a part of the rational calculus of the producer as any
other cost, and the severity of regulatory fines will likely have significant motivational impact.”
(footnotes omitted)).
132
133
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of the illegal activity, taking into account the documented benefit and the
likelihood of escaping detection.”135
Penalties can and should exceed ill-gotten gains. In a 2012 action against
Google, for example, the Commission estimated that the penalties obtained
(based on an alleged order violation) constituted more than five times the
company’s ill-gotten gains.136 Meanwhile, penalties that do not exceed (or
even capture) ill-gotten gains are generally too lenient, in that they are
unlikely to deter others from engaging in similar misconduct, especially when
the likelihood of detection is low.137
In addition to deterring wrongful conduct more effectively than equitable
relief, civil penalties can be calibrated to the severity of the misconduct.138
The FTC Act already lays out factors for courts to consider when ordering
civil penalties. However, the Commission has never issued any interpretive
rules or guidance, and these factors leave courts with considerable discretion.
In contrast, many agencies explicitly outline when self-reporting of unlawful

135 Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 44 Fed. Reg.
38,817, 38,825 (July 3, 1979); see also United States v. DISH Network LLC, 954 F.3d 970, 980 (noting
that because many violations go undetected, penalties should constitute an “appropriate multiplier”
of harm).
136 After the FTC’s proposed settlement with Google was challenged in court as being
inadequate, the Commission responded that “Google’s penalty was many times over the upperbound of what the FTC estimates the company earned from the alleged violation.” United States’
Resp. to Consumer Watchdog’s Amicus Curiae Br. at 9-10, United States v. Google, Inc., No. 3:1204177, 2012 WL 13080180 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2012).
137 Penalty judgments that do not exceed or even capture ill-gotten gains raise concerns. See, e.g.,
Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra, Google LLC and YouTube, LLC, FTC File No.
1723083, 2019 WL 4256289 (F.T.C.), at *1 (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
public_statements/1542957/chopra_google_youtube_dissent.pdf [https://perma.cc/CMR3-UQ4L] (arguing
that the civil penalty obtained against Google failed to capture revenue derived from the illegal surveillance
of children); see also Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra, Speedway Motorsports, FTC File No.
X010021, 2018 WL 3995652 (F.T.C.), at *1 (Aug. 10, 2018) [hereinafter Chopra, Speedway Motorsports],
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1400510/x010021_oil_chem_speedway_rc_sta
tement.pdf [https://perma.cc/QU99-BZ62] (arguing that the Commission should not allow defendants to
profit from order violations).
138 Under 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(C), courts are directed, in awarding civil penalties, to take into
account “the degree of culpability, any history of prior such conduct, ability to pay, effect on ability
to continue to do business, and such other matters as justice may require.” That last factor in
particular affords courts considerable discretion. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A).
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conduct will be rewarded with a degree of leniency.139 Armed with civil
penalty authority, the Commission can do the same.140
Notably, in addition to advancing deterrence, civil penalties can also
further the goal of obtaining adequate equitable relief. When the Commission
has a clear basis to seek civil penalties against a firm, it is well positioned to
instead seek fulsome redress as part of a negotiated settlement, or to seek a
combination of the two.
As noted earlier, a unique feature of civil penalty actions is that the
Commission must refer complaints for civil penalties to the Attorney General
to litigate the matter in the name of the United States. This has been
successful. For example, in 2017, the Department of Justice litigated to a final
judgment a civil penalty action against Dish Network. The judgment
included $280 million in civil penalties.141
This arrangement also allows the Department of Justice to evaluate the
Commission’s investigation for violations of other civil and criminal statutes.
It can bring to bear the expertise of the appropriate federal prosecutor, such
as the United States Attorney of a federal district, whose office may have
unique insights into local markets where the conduct may have occurred.
Furthermore, the arrangement can help preserve FTC resources while
also preserving its independence. If the Attorney General does not take
action within 45 days of the civil penalty action referral, the Commission may
file the complaint in its own name.142 In addition, the Attorney General will
generally not settle any Commission referral without the Agency’s assent.143
139 See, e.g., EPA’s Audit Policy, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/compliance/epas-audit-policy
[https://perma.cc/SB7P-TT3A]; Share Class Selection Disclosure Initiative, DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT,
SEC, https://www.sec.gov/enforce/announcement/scsd-initiative [https://perma.cc/WM2Q-PAEP];
Responsible Business Conduct: Self-Policing, Self-Reporting, Remediation, and Cooperation, CFPB BULL.
(June 25, 2013), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb_bulletin_responsible-conduct.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2X9A-KP5S] (outlining the policies regarding self-reporting of unlawful conduct
from the EPA, SEC, and CFPB, respectively). The FTC also provides guidance in certain contexts.
For example, for companies that fail to comply with Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) reporting
requirements, the FTC advises that they should remedy this failure as soon as possible, and provide
an explanation of why the notification was not filed, when that failure was discovered, and what steps
they have taken to prevent a future violation. Hart-Scott-Rodino Premerger Notification Program: What
is the Premerger Notification Program?, FTC, 14 (Mar. 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/attachments/premerger-introductory-guides/guide1.pdf [https://perma.cc/BA7Y-CCGV].
140 Early in his tenure, then-Commissioner Chopra called on the Commission to do so. See
Chopra, Speedway Motorsports, supra note 137.
141 Press Release, FTC, Court Orders $280 Million from Dish Network, Largest Ever Do Not
Call Penalty (June 8, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2017/06/courtorders-280-million-dish-network-largest-ever-do-not [https://perma.cc/7QXB-7RVJ].
142 15 U.S.C. § 56(a)(1).
143 Section 5(m)(1)(C)(3) authorizes the Commission to “compromise or settle any action for
a civil penalty if such compromise or settlement is accompanied by a public statement of its reasons
and is approved by the court.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(C)(3).
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If the Commission resurrects the use of the Penalty Offense Authority,
the Agency should formalize an agreement between the Federal Trade
Commission and the Attorney General that would help to mature and
operationalize the existing referral process. It is important that the Federal
Trade Commission and the Attorney General can share enforcement
responsibilities in a predictable and orderly way.
2. Lessened Litigation Risk
In addition to increasing deterrence, deploying the Penalty Offense
Authority can substantially reduce litigation risk for the Commission relative
to cases seeking equitable relief, such as those brought under any successor to
§ 13(b). As noted, even before AMG, seeking restitution or disgorgement
presents risks when it comes to calculating harm.144 Pursuing equitable
monetary relief generally requires the Commission to estimate consumer
harm or ill-gotten gains—an estimation that a defendant can, of course, try
to rebut. This means that even in cases of clear wrongdoing, if the harm is
difficult to quantify, well-heeled defendants can, at a minimum, make the
pursuit of monetary relief risky, expensive, and time consuming.
In contrast to its authority to seek equitable monetary relief, nothing in
the existing case law or the FTC Act suggests these penalties should be
limited to a rigid calculation of direct loss. On the contrary, victims’ losses or
wrongdoers’ gains are not among the listed statutory factors for calibrating
civil penalties.145
By invoking § 13(b)—even in its diminished form—in addition to the
Penalty Offense Authority, the Commission can also seek injunctive relief
through penalty actions. Section 13(b) expressly authorizes courts to issue
injunctions, and it can be invoked by the Commission whenever it has reason
to believe that the law is being broken. As such, any conceivable case under a
penalty offense strategy would also be actionable under § 13(b), meaning the
Commission could plead under both authorities, and seek both injunctive
relief and civil penalties.146
See supra Part II.
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(C) (laying out the civil penalty factors for violations). The
Chairman of the Commission has made clear that harm should not be a ceiling on penalties. See
Statement of Chairman Joseph J. Simons, FTC v. Hyperbeard Inc., FTC File. No. 1923109, 2020
WL 3073324 (F.T.C.), at *1 (June 4, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public
_statements/1576438/192_3109_hyperbeard_-_statement_of_chairman_simons.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G7Q9-DKQB] (expressing disagreement with the Commissioner’s view that civil
money penalties start with harm).
146 Although the FTC’s core ability to seek injunctions under § 13(b) is not under challenge,
there have been challenges to the Commission’s ability to obtain injunctions when misconduct has
ceased. See FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc., 917 F.3d 147, 150 (rejecting the FTC’s extension of §
144
145
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To be clear, utilizing the Penalty Offense Authority does not eliminate
the Commission’s litigation risks. As noted, the authority affords defendants
exceptionally strong due process protections. However, what this tool can
eliminate is the gamesmanship that has plagued efforts to calculate harm or
ill-gotten gains down to a penny, with any uncertainty accruing to the benefit
of wrongdoers. Under the Penalty Offense Authority, the merits of any
individual case can be disputed aggressively, but the Agency’s power to seek
remedies that actually deter is beyond dispute.
3. Market-wide Impact
The Penalty Offense Authority is well suited to have market-wide impact.
By serving notice of a Commission determination on firms across an
industry—while making clear that the determination is binding, enforceable,
and backed by civil penalties—the Commission can correct market-wide illegal
practices. In fact, because civil penalties are available through the Penalty
Offense Authority—as they are for rulemaking—this changes the calculus for
firms in ways that increase compliance, while reducing the need to bring
enforcement actions for similar conduct over and over again. Notably, in the
early years of the program, most companies that received penalty offense
notifications appear to have come into compliance voluntarily.147
The Penalty Offense Authority is also flexible, affording the Commission
discretion to deploy the authority strategically in certain industries or during
certain times. For example, during the present pandemic, the FTC recently
invoked its authority under § 5(m)(1)(B) to warn marketers of diabetes
treatments that they could face civil penalties for deceptive claims.148
To be clear, we do not believe a penalty offense program is a substitute
for deploying other tools in the Commission’s arsenal, such as rulemaking,
that can also help promote compliance market-wide. We believe that dusting
off these tools is vital to not only protecting consumers but also effectively
stewarding the Agency’s scarce resources. As detailed throughout this Article,
there are certain practices—such as income misrepresentations—that the
13(b)’s reach). However, since actions under the Penalty Offense Authority would requiring a
showing that companies knowingly broke the law, this hurdle is unlikely to impede the program, as
the Commission would be able to show that the conduct is either ongoing or likely to recur, absent
an injunction.
147 According to Commissioner Patricia Bailey, the Commission’s early use of § 5(m)(1)(B)
resulted in a “high level of voluntary compliance achieved quickly and at a low cost.” Testimony of
Commissioner Patricia P. Bailey Before the H.R., supra note 125, at 138-39.
148 Press Release, FTC, FTC Sends Cease and Desist Demands to 10 Companies Suspected
of Making Diabetes Treatment Claims Without the Required Scientific Evidence (Sept. 9, 2021),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2021/09/ftc-sends-cease-desist-demands-10companies-suspected-making [https://perma.cc/T4ZQ-8GCL].
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Commission has been battling through case-by-case enforcement for decades,
without any appreciable impact on compliance. This raises questions about
whether the Agency’s status quo approach represents an efficient use of
taxpayer resources, and it suggests that deploying additional tools could
increase the Agency’s effectiveness.
IV. Potential Applications of the Penalty Offense Authority
Section 13(b) was a critical tool for the Commission, but even before AMG,
it was not always the Agency’s strongest tool. To assess where it would be
beneficial to deploy the Penalty Offense Authority, the Commission should
look to the following three criteria: (1) where a harmful practice has been
condemned in a Commission order, but is not forbidden by rule; (2) where it
is feasible that major market participants are or could be placed on notice of
the penalty offense; and (3) where the FTC’s traditional enforcement program
underdeters this wrongdoing, either because equitable relief is difficult to
measure or because it is insufficient to remedy and deter harms.
We have identified five areas where the Commission could designate
penalty offenses based on existing orders: for-profit college fraud, false
earnings claims targeting workers, online disinformation, deceptive data
harvesting, and illegal targeted marketing. Each area is discussed in turn.
A. For-Profit College Fraud
For-profit colleges market themselves as offering prospective students a
fast track to rewarding careers, but this marketing often involves
misrepresentations that violate the FTC Act. Although its engagement in
this area has varied over time, the Commission has been targeting deceptive
practices in this industry since the 1920s.149 In 1976, following an extensive
study of the for-profit school sector, the Commission found widespread
problems including high-pressure sales tactics, false claims of selectivity, and
“an appalling lack of substantiation for the job and earnings claims that are
made.”150 The Report further found that the industry was failing to comply

149 We thank Muriel Kenfield-Kelleher, who examined the FTC’s enforcement history in this
space through her participation in Harvard Law School’s Project on Predatory Student Lending, for
vital contributions to this Section, including by identifying two FTC enforcement actions from 1925.
See F.W. Dobe, 8 F.T.C. 383, 384, 390 (1925) (holding that the advertising at issue constituted unfair
methods of competition); Civ. Serv. Sch., Inc., 22 F.T.C. 471, 473 (1925) (same). During this period,
deceptive practices by for-profit colleges were charged as being unfair methods of competition.
150 See FTC, PROPRIETARY VOCATIONAL AND HOME STUDY SCHOOLS: FINAL REP. TO
THE FED. TRADE COMM’N AND PROPOSED TRADE REGULATION RULE (16 CFR PART 438), at
385 (1976), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED134790.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9WD-UWZJ].
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with the Commission’s voluntary guides, and that “case-by-case adjudication
was not achieving the requisite prophylactic effect.”151
Although the Commission initiated a rulemaking in the 1970s to combat
these harmful practices, it abandoned these efforts as part of the broader
deregulatory dismantling of the Agency in the 1980s,152 and returned to the
enforcement approach that the Commission itself had deemed a failure.
The last few decades have laid bare the problems with the FTC’s handsoff approach to for-profit colleges. In the 2000s, for-profit enrollment and
defaults surged, and a comprehensive Senate report showed that many of the
problems highlighted by the FTC in the 1970s had only worsened.153 Veterans
returning from Iraq and Afghanistan faced particularly problematic
recruitment, as publicly traded companies like DeVry, Corinthian Colleges,
University of Phoenix, and Career Education Corporation took in billions in
veterans’ benefits.154
Yet the FTC largely stood idle during the worst years of for-profit
predation after the financial crisis, bringing no major cases, even as state
attorneys general and the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau filed
multiple lawsuits against major market players.155 The FTC finally took a
significant action with a settlement in 2016 against DeVry, using its authority

151 Id. at 2. The Report also quoted the Washington Post, which weighed in that “the FTC’s
investigations have been necessarily tedious, its proceedings ponderous, and its penalties limited.”
Id. at 2-3.
152 In 1980, the Second Circuit vacated the Commission’s proposed rule on the ground that the
Commission failed to define with specificity the practices determined to be unfair and deceptive,
among other grounds cited. Katherine Gibbs Sch. v. FTC, 612 F.2d 658, 662 (2d Cir. 1980). The
Agency could have corrected these deficiencies, but it declined to do so.
153 See generally STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LAB., & PENSIONS, 112TH CONG.,
FOR PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION: THE FAILURE TO SAFEGUARD THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT
AND ENSURE STUDENT SUCCESS (Comm. Print 2012).
154 VETERANS EDUC. SUCCESS, WHY FOR-PROFIT SCHOOLS ARE TARGETING VETERANS
EDUCATION BENEFITS 10 (2014), https://vetsedsuccess.org/why-for-profit-institutions-are-targetingveterans-education-benefits [https://perma.cc/P6RW-3GHT].
155 See, e.g., Press Release, CFPB, CFPB Sues For-Profit Corinthian Colleges for Predatory
Lending Scheme (Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-sues-forprofit-corinthian-colleges-for-predatory-lending-scheme [https://perma.cc/Q8V4-6YS7]; Press Release,
Off. of the N.Y. Att’y Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Announces Groundbreaking $10.25 Million Dollar
Settlement With For-Profit Education Company That Inflated Job Placement Rates To Attract Students
(Aug. 19, 2013), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2013/ag-schneiderman-announces-groundbreaking-1025million-dollar-settlement-profit [https://perma.cc/4YXM-CS35]; Press Release, Ill. Att’y Gen.,
Madigan Sues National For-Profit College (Jan. 18, 2012), https://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/
pressroom/2012_01/20120118.html [https://perma.cc/66VW-SQBC].
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under § 13(b).156 The Commission’s 2019 settlement with the University of
Phoenix was also brought under 13(b).157
Although the Commission has sought and obtained equitable monetary
relief in these recent actions against for-profit schools, the incentive to
mislead prospective students—especially veterans—is overwhelming.
Recruiting a single student can easily earn a school tens of thousands of
dollars in taxpayer funded tuition dollars, and because of a regulatory
loophole, recruiting veterans is even more remunerative, as every dollar in
tuition collected through military benefits allows schools to collect nine
dollars in other federal funds.158 It is no surprise that in its recent action
against University of Phoenix, the FTC charged that veterans were targeted
with misrepresentations.159
In light of the enormous potential to profit through deception, these FTC
actions are unlikely to significantly deter ongoing or future for-profit fraud.
For example, the FTC’s recent order against University of Phoenix included
$191 million in relief—a large headline number, but only a fraction of the
tuition the school collected from students targeted by its deceptive ads.160 As
156 See Press Release, FTC, DeVry University Agrees to $100 Million Settlement with FTC
(Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/12/devry-university-agrees100-million-settlement-ftc [https://perma.cc/SE2Z-XBTH].
157 Press Release, FTC, FTC Obtains Record $191 Million Settlement from University of
Phoenix to Resolve FTC Charges It Used Deceptive Advertising to Attract Prospective Students
(Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/12/ftc-obtains-record-191-millionsettlement-university-phoenix [https://perma.cc/SN2P-GMXA].
158 More than two decades ago, through the so-called 90/10 rule, Congress capped the
percentage of revenue that for-profit schools can earn from U.S. Department of Education programs
at ninety percent. See 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a)(24) (“In the case of a proprietary institution of higher
education . . ., such institution will derive not less than ten percent of such institution’s revenues
from sources other than funds [as statutorily allowed].”). This was a market test designed to ensure
programs would meet quality standards that would attract students paying out of pocket. Many bad
actors found a loophole and instead decided to engage in predatory recruiting of those with federal
military benefits. See What is the 90/10 Loophole?, VETERANS EDUC. SUCCESS,
https://veteranseducationsuccess.org/90-10-loophole [https://perma.cc/M3ZX-6QGG] (describing
the aggressive and deceptive marketing and recruiting tactics used by for-profit colleges targeted at
service members and veterans).
159 Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief ¶¶ 52-54, FTC v. Univ.
of Phoenix, No. 2:19-05772 (D. Ariz. Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
cases/university_of_phoenix_ftc_v_uop_complaint_signed.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7WB-DC3Z].
160 See id. at ¶ 11 (“[University of Phoenix] has charged consumers tuition ranging from about
$7,400 to $19,400 per year, depending on the program.”); Press Release, FTC, FTC Sends Nearly $50
Million in Refunds to University of Phoenix Students (Mar. 24, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2021/03/ftc-sends-nearly-50-million-refunds-university-phoenix-students
[https://perma.cc/DYF7-AY83] (reporting that FTC refunded 147,000 students which means that the
average refund was $340 per student); see also Press Release, FTC, FTC Obtains Record $191 Million
Settlement from University of Phoenix to Resolve FTC Charges It Used Deceptive Advertising to
Attract Prospective Students (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/12/ftcobtains-record-191-million-settlement-university-phoenix [https://perma.cc/GKV4-3MEA].
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to the students themselves, the harm they suffered likely far exceeds what the
Commission can provide in refunds. Their tuition alone is far greater than
what they will receive, and this does not even take into account the collateral
consequences of for-profit fraud—thousands in interest payments, defaults
that increase the cost of credit, collections that send borrowers’ bank accounts
into the red, and other harms, including opportunity costs.
These deficiencies underscore some of the key drawbacks—regardless of
whether § 13(b) is restored—in seeking equitable relief alone in complex cases
of corporate fraud. First, in litigation, approximating harm experienced by
tens of thousands of students can be challenging, especially against deeppocketed institutions. Certain students may not have enrolled but for the
misrepresentations, suggesting full redress (and more) is appropriate, while
others may have suffered lesser harms.161 Second, even a robust order would
likely be insufficient to deter the conduct, given the overwhelming
recruitment incentives described earlier.
Activating penalties in addition to equitable relief could materially change
this incentive structure, while providing more fulsome relief to students.
Penalties in a case involving thousands of students can quickly escalate and
can wipe out a school’s illegal earnings and more. The prospect of facing civil
penalties, which survive bankruptcy reorganizations, could therefore be a
substantial deterrent against a lawbreaking, and a counterweight to the
economic incentives to lie.
Using existing orders, the Commission can act swiftly to ensure schools
are on notice that certain common practices are penalty offenses. For
example, in 1959, the Commission determined that it was deceptive to make
false claims around the urgency of enrollment, selectivity, accreditation, or
postgraduation earnings,162 and many of these findings were repeated in
subsequent orders.163 Of course, these practices continue to permeate the
sector decades later.164
The Commission should also inventory its prior orders to determine
whether other misrepresentations—such as misrepresenting transferability of
credit—have also been conclusively determined to be illegal. Accreditors and
state agencies can be enlisted to assist in this strategy, including by providing
161 In our experience, almost all students enrolling in career colleges are, in fact, doing so based
on promises of gainful employment, but there is at least a theoretical possibility that some may be
enrolling for other reasons.
162 Nw. Air Coll., Inc., 55 F.T.C. 712, 714-15 (1959).
163 See E. Detective Acad., Inc., 78 F.T.C. 1428, 1461 (1971) (finding it was deceptive to make
false earnings claims); Macmillan, Inc., 96 F.T.C. 208, 298 (1980) (finding it was misleading to make
false earnings and selectivity claims).
164 See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LAB., & PENSIONS, supra note 153, at 1-10
(finding widespread misrepresentations in the for-profit college sector, including around
accreditation and job placement rate).
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formal notifications on their own. This strategy could significantly strengthen
the FTC’s ability to combat widespread illegal deception by for-profit colleges.
B. False Earnings Claims Targeting Workers
The for-profit school sector is just one of many industries that lure victims
in with lies about potential earnings. For decades, the FTC has been battling
firms that pitch “business opportunities” by making false claims about the
amount of money participants can earn. The problem of false earnings claims
is widespread, so much so that the Commission retains two rules—the
Franchise Rule and Business Opportunity Rule—expressly designed to
regulate these claims.165 But these rules generally do not cover two major
components of the economy: multilevel marketers and gig economy
employers, like rideshare and food delivery services.166 In both of these areas,
the Commission can significantly step up its deterrence by implementing a
penalty offense program.
Multilevel marketing is a business model where individual distributors
are recruited to both sell products to family and friends and enlist others to
become distributors. Under certain circumstances, the Commission regards
these firms as constituting an illegal pyramid scheme.
The Commission’s Koscot decision in 1975 established the key test for when
a multilevel marketing operation constitutes an illegal pyramid scheme.167
Essentially, when a company compensates distributors based on recruitment
rather than actual sales, this indicates the company is operating as an illegal
pyramid scheme.168 Relevant here, the Commission also found in Koscot that
it was deceptive to mislead prospective recruits about how much income they
could earn.169
Forty-five years after Koscot, the Commission continues to rely on its
findings to battle firms it believes are operating illegally. Between 2018 and
2020, the Commission brought two actions against alleged pyramid schemes—
Nerium (now known as Neora) and Advocare.170 In the latter case, the
See 16 C.F.R. § 436 (Franchise Rule); 16 C.F.R. § 437 (Business Opportunity Rule).
See sources cited supra note 165.
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 1106, 1180 (1975).
The decision found that pyramid schemes are “characterized by the payment by participants
of money to the company in return for which they receive (1) the right to sell a product and (2) the
right to receive in return for recruiting other participants into the program rewards which are
unrelated to the sale of the product to ultimate users.” Id.
169 Id. at 1134-36.
170 Press Release, FTC, FTC Sues Multi-Level Marketer Neora, Formerly Known as Nerium,
Alleging It Operates as an Illegal Pyramid Scheme (Nov. 1, 2019) [hereinafter Press Release, FTC
Sues Multi-Level Marketer Neora], https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/11/ftc-suesmulti-level-marketer-neora-formerly-known-nerium [https://perma.cc/ECT3-2UPN]; Press Release,
FTC, Multi-Level Marketer AdvoCare Will Pay $150 Million to Settle FTC Charges It Operated an
165
166
167
168
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Commission successfully shut down the alleged pyramid structure entirely;
the former is in litigation as of this writing.171 In both cases, in addition to
being charged with operating an illegal pyramid scheme, the companies were
charged with misleading recruits about prospective earnings.172
As shown in these recent actions, § 13(b) was at times a useful tool to
check pyramid schemes and, ideally, return funds to victims. In cases like
Advocare, for example, the Commission relied on the authority to recover
millions in ill-gotten gains while obtaining injunctive relief to halt the alleged
scheme. The Commission is seeking significant relief against Nerium as well.
But while this approach has yielded some successes, it also carries serious
drawbacks. Determining whether a multilevel marketing operation qualifies as
an illegal pyramid scheme requires resource intensive investigations that can
last years. During this time, more victims will likely suffer, while owners and
top distributors can dissipate assets. Furthermore, the structure and size of a
multilevel marketing operation can change considerably during this period,
which can complicate litigation should the FTC decide to sue. Finally, if the
FTC does sue, litigation can drag on for years as experts battle over whether
the structure of the business is illegal. Altogether, it is not clear that the
Commission’s current enforcement approach is adequately deterring the most
pernicious pyramid schemes, which continue to emerge year after year despite
decades of FTC warnings.173 And whatever advantages this enforcement
approach offered were largely eliminated by the decision in AMG. 174
In the past, the FTC considered a different approach to this problem, but
decided not to pursue it. In 2006, the Commission proposed to expand the
coverage of its existing Business Opportunity Rule to require multilevel
marketers to provide accurate earnings disclosures to potential recruits or face
civil penalties for their failure to do so.175 In its Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, the Commission observed that false earnings claims are “not
uncommon,” are key to recruiting distributors, and have been challenged in
more than twenty FTC actions from 1990 to 2006.176 However, the MLM
Illegal Pyramid Scheme (Oct. 2, 2019) [hereinafter Press Release, AdvoCare], https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/press-releases/2019/10/multi-level-marketer-advocare-will-pay-150-million-settle-ftc
[https://perma.cc/ECT3-2UPN].
171 Press Release, Advocare supra note 170.
172 Id.; Press Release, FTC Sues Multi-Level Marketer Neora, supra note 170.
173 That is, while 13(b) enforcement actions can—often after many years—shut down an
individual scheme, the pace of the process and the lack of penalty authority make it unlikely that
these actions effectuate sufficient general deterrence.
174 See supra Introduction.
175 Business Opportunity Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 19,054, 19,067-70 (proposed Apr. 12, 2006) (final
rule codified at 16 C.F.R. § 437).
176 See id. at 19,060 (listing FTC actions challenging deceptive earnings claims and noting
“pyramid schemes often deceive consumers with the promise of large potential incomes”).
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industry fiercely objected to being bound by this rule, and the FTC agreed
to generally exclude multilevel marketers from its coverage.177 At least until
recently, the FTC has taken the position that case-by-case enforcement under
§ 13(b) has been an effective strategy.178
The Commission should reconsider its approach to this problem. While it
is reasonable to debate whether rules requiring specific disclosures will reduce
the harmful consequences of deception, there is no debate that the problem
those disclosures were designed to correct—false earnings claims—is
widespread and illegal. Yet this problem persists year after year. For example,
early in the COVID-19 pandemic, the Commission sent warning letters to
nine multilevel marketing firms allegedly making false earnings claims.179
These warnings could be significantly more effective if they included
notice of penalty offenses. There are numerous final, litigated orders in which
the Commission has determined that deceptive practices by multilevel
marketing companies are unlawful under § 5.180 If these orders were served
on major multilevel marketers today, they would be on notice that they face
substantial civil penalties for engaging in any of the prohibited conduct.
For example, numerous litigated orders condemn the practice of
misleading potential recruits about the income they can earn.181 Serving
notice of the Commission’s determination on this issue alone would make
clear that false earnings claims constitute a penalty offense. Doing so could
offer a number of advantages for the Commission’s enforcement program.182

177 See Business Opportunity Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 76,816, 76,818 (Dec. 8, 2011) (codified at 16
C.F.R. § 437) (stating that the Commission decided to narrow the scope of the rule after having
received more than 17,000 comments from the MLM industry, which argued that it was unfair to
apply the rule to legitimate MLMs).
178 See Business Guidance Concerning Multi-level Marketing, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/business-center/guidance/business-guidance-concerning-multi-level-marketing
[https://perma.cc/JWY9-G55H] (arguing that, when it comes to MLM oversight, case-by-case
enforcement “can offer significant benefits when compared with prescriptive rulemaking or
legislative action”).
179 Press Release, FTC, FTC Sends Warning Letters to Multi-Level Marketers Regarding
Health and Earnings Claims They or Their Participants are Making Related to Coronavirus (Apr.
24, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/04/ftc-sends-warning-letters-multilevel-marketers-regarding-health [https://perma.cc/Y5WP-F2BE].
180 See, e.g., Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 1106 (1975); Holiday Magic, Inc., 84 F.T.C.
748 (1974); Amway Corp., Inc., 93 F.T.C. 618 (1979); Nat’l Dynamics Corp., 82 F.T.C. 488 (1973),
aff ’d in part and rev ‘d. in part, 492 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 993 (1974), reissued,
85 F.T.C. 391 (1976).
181 See sources cited supra note 180 and accompanying text.
182 In our experience, multilevel marketing firms are already deeply familiar with the
Commission’s history in this area, particularly with decisions like Koscot. As such, while serving
notice of these orders certainly makes sense, it is likely the Commission could show actual knowledge
even without one.
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First, designating income misrepresentations as a penalty offense has
potential to deter one of the most problematic yet ubiquitous features of
this industry: false promises of rich profits, which is what lures so many
recruits. Second, it would give the Commission additional tools to correct
and deter violations: if operators ignore warnings, the Commission could
launch a full investigation to determine if an operator is a pyramid, and then
seek both injunctions through § 13(b) and civil penalties. Or, it could pursue
a narrower approach that targets the income misrepresentations, which may
allow it to obtain meaningful relief much more expeditiously than a full
blown pyramid prosecution.183
Importantly, this strategy can be replicated in other areas where
companies make false earnings claims to recruit participants. For example, a
growing number of Americans earn their living through the so-called gig
economy, and the FTC has already accused one of the biggest players in the
space of misrepresenting income that workers can expect to earn.184
Restitution or disgorgement is a poor remedy for this type of fraud. First,
working in the gig economy can impose significant opportunity costs,
meaning that the harm to workers can far exceed the gap between what they
earn and what they were promised, which is how restitution would likely be
calculated. Second, gig economy firms can realize huge benefits from
deceptive income claims, as recruiting workers can make their services more
valuable, yielding network effects that can lock in a firm’s dominance.185
Similar to in the pyramid context, the Commission has held repeatedly
for decades that using inflated earnings claims to recruit workers or
distributors is a deceptive practice under the FTC Act. In fact, there was a
series of litigated orders targeting sales outfits like Encyclopedia Britannica—
one of the “gig” employers of its day.186 In the order against Britannica, for
example, the Commission found that that “[t]here is obvious deception where

183 There is precedent for the Commission targeting alleged income misrepresentations by
multilevel marketers, rather than their structure. See, e.g., Press Release, FTC, FTC Action Halts
MOBE, a Massive Internet Business Coaching Scheme (June 11, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2018/06/ftc-action-halts-mobe-massive-internet-business-coaching-scheme
[https://perma.cc/XV2D-XP87].
184 See Press Release, FTC, $20 Million FTC Settlement Requires Uber to Have Proof for Earnings,
Auto Financing Claims (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2017/01/20million-ftc-settlement-requires-uber-have-proof-earnings [https://perma.cc/L3T2-YX44].
185 In addition, recruiting gig workers based on false earnings claim can have supply side
effects, in that recruiting additional workers can reduce their compensation.
186 Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 87 F.T.C. 421, 485-89 (1976), aff ’d, 605 F.2d 964 (7th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980), modified, 100 F.T.C. 500 (1982); see also Nat’l Dynamics Corp.,
82 F.T.C. 488, 563-66 (1973) (prohibiting income misrepresentations), aff ’d and remanded on other
grounds, 492 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 993 (1974), reissued, 85 F.T.C. 391 (1976).
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respondent misrepresents the type of position being offered and the amount
of compensation that will be guaranteed.”187
The Commission should take steps to make clear that recruiting gig
workers based on false earnings claims is a penalty offense under the FTC
Act. Once platforms have knowledge of Britannica or similar orders,
misleading prospective workers comes with liability for penalties that can far
exceed whatever gains they hope to realize from deceit.188 These firms already
deny gig workers the protections that traditional workers enjoy, such as sick
leave and wage-and-hour restrictions. These failures are compounded by the
failure to deliver earnings as advertised. Gig workers should be able to avoid
wasting their time on a bad bargain.189
C. Online Disinformation
The Commission’s overreliance on § 13(b) has also hampered its efforts to
tackle fake review and influencer fraud, as well as other deceptive
disinformation campaigns online.
According to one estimate, companies spent $2.42 billion on advertising
through social media influencers in 2019, which is projected to increase to
$4.14 billion by 2022.190 Facebook’s Instagram and Google’s YouTube are
major vehicles for influencer advertising campaigns. Individuals with a
significant following can often generate major fees for posts and videos that
promote a product or brand. Unsurprisingly, fake likes, fake followers, and
fake reviews are now polluting the digital economy, making it difficult for
families and small businesses looking for truthful information.191
These fake reviews can have a huge impact on sales. A highly cited study
estimated that a one-star rating increase on Yelp translated to an increase of five
to nine percent in revenues for a restaurant.192 Another study found that a oneEncyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 87 F.T.C at 487.
As noted, formal notification is not a necessary predicate to seeking penalties under the
Penalty Offense Authority, and it is likely that a well-publicized program could place firms on notice
even if they have not received a formal notice or warning.
189 A similar strategy could be adopted in the franchise industry, where there are widespread
reports of illegal income misrepresentations to potential franchisees. Although misrepresentations
are generally prohibited by the Franchise Rule, the Rule does not directly cover entities like franchise
consultants, who are often responsible for the most egregious misrepresentations.
190 David Cohen, eMarketer Sees 33.6% Jump in US Influencer Marketing Spend in 2021, ADWEEK
(July 20 2021), https://www.adweek.com/social-marketing/emarketer-sees-33-6-jump-in-us-influencermarketing-spend-in-2021 [https://perma.cc/24DA-Z3C7].
191 Rebecca Dolan, Have Online Reviews Lost All Value?, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 27, 2019, 1:49 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/have-online-reviews-lost-all-value-11569606584
[https://perma.cc/PZZ6-4GZ8].
192 Michael Luca, Reviews, Reputation, and Revenue: The Case of Yelp.com 1 (Harv. Bus. Sch.
Working Paper No. 12-016, 2016), https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/12-016_a7e4a5a
2-03f9-490d-b093-8f951238dba2.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QBG-H7NH].
187
188
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point boost in a hotel’s online ratings at sites like Travelocity and TripAdvisor is
tied to an eleven percent jump in room rates, on average.193 There is also a
growing body of research suggesting that early, positive signals can even create a
herd effect, leading many more consumers to purchase a product.194
In addition to distorting sales in otherwise legitimate markets, fake reviews
have also been weaponized by counterfeiters. As detailed in a comprehensive
report by the Government Accountability Office, counterfeiters are using
pseudonymous reviews to boost their fake products, harming honest firms that
are forced to compete with those operating unlawfully.195
Despite the substantial distortion caused by fake reviews fraud, the
Commission has opted to pursue no-money settlements that do little to deter
the practice. In the 2019 Sunday Riley matter, the Commission charged that
the founder and chief executive officer of a successful cosmetics brand was
personally ordering her employees to write fake reviews, while giving them
instructions on how to evade detection.196 The scheme was ongoing for more
than two years, and many of these reviews appear to have been written to
smear competitors and otherwise give Sunday Riley an unfair advantage.197
In spite of the egregiousness of these allegations, the Commission resolved
its investigation with a settlement that simply ordered the company not to
repeat its lawbreaking.198
193 CHRIS ANDERSON, CTR. FOR HOSP. RSCH., THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL MEDIA ON
LODGING PERFORMANCE 11 (2012), https://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/71194/
Anderson_202012_20The_20impact_20of_20social_20media.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
[https://perma.cc/S9D8-8ELU].
194 See, e.g., Georgios Askalidis & Edward C. Malthouse, The Value of Online Customer Reviews,
16 RECSYS 155, 155 (2016) (“[T]he conversion rate of a product can increase by as much as 270% as
it accumulates reviews . . . . with the first five reviews driving the bulk of the aforementioned
increase” and that “the existence of reviews provides valuable signals to the customers, increasing
their propensity to purchase”); Lev Muchnik, Sinan Aral & Sean J. Taylor, Social Influence Bias: A
Randomized Experiment, 341 SCI. 647, 648-49 (2013) (finding that, for a given product, a single initial
positive “upvote” creates an accumulating herd effect that results in a twenty-five percent higher
average rating for that item at the end of a five month observation window compared to an initial
negative “down-vote”).
195 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-216, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
AGENCIES CAN IMPROVE EFFORTS TO ADDRESS RISKS POSED BY CHANGING COUNTERFEITS
MARKET 11 (2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/689713.pdf [https://perma.cc/JTL8-EHT9]
(“When selling online, counterfeiters may post pictures of authentic goods on the websites where
they are selling counterfeits and may post pseudonymous reviews of their products or businesses in
order to appear legitimate.”).
196 Complaint ¶¶ 8-13, Sunday Riley Modern Skincare, LLC, FTC File No. 1923008, 2019 WL
5783865 (F.T.C.) (Oct. 21, 2019) [hereinafter Sunday Riley Complaint], https://www.ftc.gov/system/
files/documents/cases/192_3008_sunday_riley_complaint_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PWB-ZHEV].
197 Sunday Riley Statement, supra note 81.
198 See Sunday Riley Modern Skincare, LLC, FTC File No. 1923008, 2019 WL 5419395
(F.T.C.), at *2 (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/192_3008_c4729_
sunday_riley_order.pdf [https://perma.cc/JLW5-6GCL].
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The Commission’s overreliance on § 13(b) also hamstrung its approach to
companies that launder advertising through high-priced influencers. The
Commission has sent warning letters to dozens of influencers who fail to
disclose their material connections to sellers,199 but a third-party analysis
conducted by nonprofit organization Truth in Advertising suggests that many
ignored the Commission’s warnings.200
For both fake reviews and advertising laundered through influencers,
deploying the Penalty Offense Authority offers substantial benefits over the
Commission’s historic approach. Forty years ago, the Commission issued an
order in Cliffdale Associates finding that it was deceptive to portray
endorsements as objective when in fact they were written by the seller’s paid
employees or contractors.201 This is the exact theory the Commission pursued
against Sunday Riley to condemn fake reviews,202 and is likewise the theory
the Agency has deployed against influencers who fail to disclose material
connections.203 If the Commission or another party notified major advertisers
about conduct condemned in the Cliffdale order, it would expose these parties
to civil penalty liability for some of the most common forms of digital
deception, including fake reviews and undisclosed influencer payments. In
Sunday Riley, this would have meant real relief for cheated customers and
real deterrence against fake review fraud.
Designating the failure to disclose material connections as a penalty
offense is long overdue. In the current environment, firms are under huge
pressure to generate fake reviews or otherwise engage in deceptive “organic”
advertising. The upside can be huge, and because the practices are so
widespread, many believe they will be put at a competitive disadvantage if
they do not engage in the same practices.204 At the same time, the vast
majority of wrongdoers likely will not be caught, underscoring the
199 Press Release, FTC, CSGO Lotto Owners Settle FTC’s First-Ever Complaint Against
Individual Social Media Influencers (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/
2017/09/csgo-lotto-owners-settle-ftcs-first-ever-complaint-against [https://perma.cc/69V5-YSRY].
200 See Shana Mueller, TINA.org Files FTC Complaint Against Instagram Influencers,
GLOBENEWSWIRE (Mar. 5, 2020, 7:00 PM), https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2019/
03/05/1747874/0/en/TINA-org-Files-FTC-Complaint-Against-Instagram-Influencers.html
[https://perma.cc/73WW-AQKN] (finding that more than ninety percent of recent warning letter
recipients continue to flout the law).
201 Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 110 (1984).
202 Sunday Riley Complaint, supra note 196.
203 See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 17-20, FTC v. Teami, LLC, No. 8:20-518 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/complaint_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y68F-KERV].
204 As explained by one leading e-commerce consultant, “incentives are incredibly high for brands
to create fake reviews or incentivize reviews,” and many brands feel “‘if I don’t do this, then I’m not staying
level with my competition, I’m literally just falling behind.’” Sapna Maheshwari, When Is a Star Not Always
a Star? When It’s an Online Review, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/28/
business/online-reviews-fake.html [https://perma.cc/298C-MKR6].
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importance of steep penalties for those who are. Given this incentive
structure, we do not believe the Commission’s historic reliance on no-money
orders (or on settlements that disgorge ill-gotten gains with no penalty) is
adequate, especially when the Agency has the authority to exact real penalties
on those who break the law.
Disinformation is polluting our digital markets, harming both consumers
and honest firms. Tackling this problem will require stepped up enforcement
both by major platforms, which can benefit from these illegal practices,205 and
the Commission. Rather than waiting for Congress or counting on selfpolicing by major platforms, the FTC should do its part by using its existing
authority to pursue penalties against those who break the law.206
D. Deceptive Data Harvesting
In the absence of a general federal data protection law, the FTC has
historically relied on its deception authority to police privacy practices.207
This means that in typical Commission privacy actions, the misconduct
alleged involves not how a company uses consumers’ information, but rather
whether such uses accord with a company’s representations.
Section 13(b), even before AMG, was poorly suited to bringing cases in
this area. Those companies with the most aggressive data harvesting practices
often do not charge consumers for their services, meaning that restitution—
which is limited to direct consumer loss—is not usually a viable theory for
seeking monetary relief. As to disgorgement, while there is no question that
unlawful data harvesting can enrich firms, these gains can be difficult to
quantify. Even if the Commission was able to develop a reasonable estimate
205 Past statements have detailed how platforms stand to profit from the spread of
disinformation. See Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra, Regarding the Endorsement Guides
Review, FTC File No. P204500, 2020 WL 763449 (F.T.C.), at *1 (Feb. 12, 2020) [hereinafter
Statement Regarding the Endorsement Guides Review], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public_statements/1566445/p204500-endorsement_guides_reg_review-chopra_stmt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9PM9-JVTF] (“Advertisers and social media platforms are seeking big returns
from influencer marketing, which can allow paid advertising to seem more authentic.”); Statement
of Commissioner Rohit Chopra Regarding the Report to Congress on Social Media Bots and
Deceptive Advertising, FTC File No. P204503, 2020 WL 4049775 (F.T.C.), at *1 (July 16, 2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1578231/social_bots_chopra_stateme
nt.pdf [https://perma.cc/C348-KPSR] (“Unfortunately, false, fraudulent, and inflammatory content
leads to higher levels of engagement.”).
206 The Commission’s guidelines in our nonbinding Endorsement Guides could also be codified
into a rule, which would trigger civil penalties for all violators with actual or constructive knowledge
of the rule. See Statement Regarding the Endorsement Guides Review, supra note 205, at *3.
207 See, e.g., Press Release, FTC, Mobile Advertising Network InMobi Settles FTC Charges
It Tracked Hundreds of Millions of Consumers’ Locations Without Permission (June 22, 2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/06/mobile-advertising-network-inmobisettles-ftc-charges-it-tracked [https://perma.cc/3S68-3W2J].
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of illegal gains, this was unlikely to deter other firms from engaging in similar
practices, especially if these practices can help entrench their dominance.
Recent history has borne this out. In 2011, the FTC reached a settlement
with Google for misleading users about the company’s privacy practices.208
Likely owing to the perceived difficulty of calculating disgorgement, the
Commission settled the case administratively for $0. The following year, the
FTC reached a settlement with Facebook after alleging similarly deceptive
practices, and again settled the matter for $0.209 These firms likely realized
massive gains through the information they illegally harvested from users, yet
they paid nothing.
Designating privacy misrepresentations as a penalty offense would alter
this landscape. Companies that lie to users about privacy practices would face
stiff penalties, rather than a slap-on-the-wrist $0 warning.210 By sending
penalty offense notifications to major tech companies and other harvesters of
consumer data, the FTC can make clear that cheating users out of their data
will come at a cost.
The Commission should inventory its existing orders to determine
whether privacy misrepresentations have been previously condemned.
Candidates already exist. For example, in a recent order against Cambridge
Analytica, the Commission found that it was deceptive for the firm to
misrepresent the types of information it was collecting from users.211
Similarly, in a decades-old order, the Commission found it was deceptive to
collect consumers’ sensitive information for one purpose, only to use it for
208 Press Release, FTC, FTC Charges Deceptive Privacy Practices in Googles Rollout of Its
Buzz Social Network (Mar. 30, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/03/ftccharges-deceptive-privacy-practices-googles-rollout-its-buzz [https://perma.cc/5EUL-NWET].
209 Press Release, FTC, FTC Approves Final Settlement With Facebook (Aug. 10, 2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/08/ftc-approves-final-settlement-facebook
[https://perma.cc/Y32U-AE96].
210 Notably, after the FTC reached administrative settlements with Facebook and Google, both
companies became liable for civil penalties for any violations. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(l). Yet in both cases, the
prospect of FTC penalties was evidently insufficient to deter further misconduct: the FTC would later
charge both firms with serious order violations. See Press Release, FTC, Google Will Pay $22.5 Million
to Settle FTC Charges It Misrepresented Privacy Assurances to Users of Apple’s Safari Internet Browser
(Aug. 9, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/08/google-will-pay-225-millionsettle-ftc-charges-it-misrepresented [https://perma.cc/HV5A-2SCJ]; Press Release, FTC, FTC Imposes
$5 Billion Penalty and Sweeping New Privacy Restrictions on Facebook (July 24, 2019)
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/07/ftc-imposes-5-billion-penalty-sweeping-newprivacy-restrictions [https://perma.cc/SZL8-VL85]. This suggests that the Commission should reassess
how it is calibrating civil penalties, given the massive gains that deception can produce.
211 Cambridge Analytica, LLC, No. 9383, 2019 WL 6724446, at *10-11 (Nov. 25, 2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/d09389_comm_final_opinionpublic.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6SSD-MLFS] (finding it was deceptive under the FTC Act to misrepresent that
an app did not collect personally identifiable information from users). The FTC also found it was
deceptive for a firm to misrepresent its participation in the US-EU Privacy Shield program, another
practice the Commission can designate as a penalty offense. Id.
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another purpose without alerting them.212 Depending on the facts, these
findings could have applicability across the digital economy.213
Illegal data harvesting undermines privacy, entrenches digital
dominance, and can endanger national security when information is
compromised. The Commission must do more to deter these practices, and
the Penalty Offense Authority could be a vital complement to other efforts
that the FTC should undertake.214
E. Illegal Targeted Marketing
Social media platforms earn almost all of their revenue by building
detailed dossiers on users that can then be deployed to target advertising to
individual consumers.215 For example, Facebook—which earns nearly all of its
revenue from advertisers—touts its ability to target individual users based on
their “behaviors” and “interests,” as well as its ability to match an advertiser’s
existing customer base to users meeting a similar profile, the so-called
Lookalike Audience feature.216 Facebook gathers this information through
surreptitious surveillance of users’ activities on the platform.

212 Beneficial Corp., 86 F.T.C. 119, 168-77 (1975) (finding that it was deceptive for a tax
preparation firm to use consumers’ tax information for marketing purposes without their consent).
213 For example, in 2019, the FTC charged Facebook with collecting users’ phone numbers for
purposes of enabling two-factor authentication, only to use their phone numbers for marketing.
Complaint ¶¶ 5-6, United States v. Facebook, Inc., No. 19-02184 (D.D.C. July 24, 2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/182_3109_facebook_complaint_filed_7-24-19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8JKD-S6SX].
214 In connection with a report prepared for Congress, then-Commissioner Chopra proposed
numerous improvements to the FTC’s privacy and data security program. Statement Regarding the
Rep. to Cong. on Privacy and Security, supra note 29.
215 See, e.g., Facebook Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 7 (Jan. 28, 2021), https://d18rn0p2
5nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001326801/5fc46b22-5cb5-4014-bcb7-7edc64f2d963.pdf
[https://perma.cc/45D6-PTQ3] (“We generate substantially all of our revenue from selling
advertising placements to marketers. Our ads enable marketers to reach people based on a variety
of factors including age, gender, location, interests, and behaviors. Marketers purchase ads that can
appear in multiple places including on Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, and third-party applications
and websites.”).
216 Business Help Center: Your Guide to Digital Advertising, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
business/help/1029863103720320?id=802745156580214 (last visited Sept. 28, 2021).
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“Targeted” or “behavioral” advertising raises a host of consumer protection
and competition concerns, including privacy,217 discrimination,218 fraud,219 and
unfair competition.220 Relevant here, however, is whether these practices
implicate the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), which dictates that
consumer reports can be sold only for certain permissible purposes.221 While
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is the primary enforcer of the
FCRA, the FTC also can enforce the statute for a subset of covered entities,
and any violations of its requirements are illegal under the FTC Act.222
Historically, the Commission has deployed this authority to ensure that
consumer reports are not sold for purposes that are illegal under the FCRA.
For example, in the 1980s, TransUnion launched a “target marketing” division
that used data collected in its consumer reporting business to develop
marketing lists that were then sold to third parties.223 In a progenitor to
217 See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra, Facebook, Inc., FTC File No.
1823109, 2019 WL 3386452 (F.T.C.), at *3 (July 24, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public_statements/1536911/chopra_dissenting_statement_on_facebook_7-24-19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S2P5-LT9J] (stating Facebook’s practices violated people’s privacy).
218 See Dep’t. of Hous. & Urb. Dev. v. Facebook, Inc., FHEO No. 01-18-0323-8, at 3 (Mar. 28, 2019)
(Charge of Discrimination), https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/Main/documents/HUD_v_Facebook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WN7D-T86H] (stating that the way Facebook designed its advertising platform led
to housing advertisements being targeted in discriminatory ways).
219 See Kelsey Sutton, Facebook Hid Inflated Video Ad Metrics Error for Over a Year, Advertisers
Allege, ADWEEK (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.adweek.com/digital/facebook-hid-inflated-video-admetrics-error-for-over-a-year-advertisers-allege [https://perma.cc/4KVU-66ZT] (stating Facebook
intentionally overstated average watch times on paid video ads).
220 See Patience Haggin & Kara Dapena, Google’s Ad Dominance Explained in Three Charts, THE
WALL ST. J. (June 17, 2019, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-googles-advertisingdominance-is-drawing-antitrust-scrutiny-11560763800 [https://perma.cc/4KVU-66ZT] (explaining
how Google’s ad services are anticompetitive).
221 Under the FCRA, a “consumer report” is:

any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting
agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity,
character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used
or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a
factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for [credit, insurance, employment or
government license].
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d). A consumer reporting agency, in turn, is defined as:
any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis,
regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating
consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of
furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of
interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports.
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f). The FCRA defines “permissible purposes” at 15 U.S.C. § 1681b.
222 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a)(1) (“[C]ompliance with the requirements imposed under this
subchapter shall be enforced under the Federal Trade Commission Act.”).
223 Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 81 F.3d 228, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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contemporary targeted advertising practices, TransUnion compiled targeted
lists of consumers by fitting them into profiles like “empty nesters” or
“suburban elite,” based on information the company compiled through its
consumer reporting business.224 The FTC alleged that these lists constituted
consumer reports, which can be sold only for permissible purposes.225
The FTC’s litigation against TransUnion lasted nearly a decade, and out
of it emerged two key findings. First, in 1994, the Commission found that
TransUnion’s “target marketing” was not a permissible purpose under the
FCRA for which consumer reports can be furnished,226 a finding later
affirmed by the D.C. Circuit.227 Second, in 2000, the Commission found that
TransUnion’s marketing lists constituted consumer reports, as the
“information disclosed through these products is the type of information that
is ‘used’ and/or ‘expected to be used’ in whole or in part for the purpose of
serving as a factor in establishing a consumer’s eligibility for credit.”228
The Commission’s findings may have implications for social media
platforms and other firms that sell access to lists of consumers based on
attributes they share, if these attributes are used to make decisions around
credit, housing, or employment. For example, the CFPB has been exploring
whether aggregators of financial data are covered by the FCRA.229 Similarly,
scholars and advocates are raising questions as to whether tech platforms may
be acting as consumer reporting agencies,230 including if platforms develop
See id. at 229 (describing reports).
Trans Union Corp., 116 F.T.C. 1334, 1349-54 (1993).
Trans Union Corp., 118 F.T.C. 821, 869-70 (1994), rev’d in part and remanded by Trans Union
Corp. v. FTC, 81 F.3d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
227 See Trans Union Corp., 81 F.3d at 234 (affirming that target marketing was not a permissible
purpose but remanding the case to the Commission to resolve whether Transunion’s lists constituted
consumer reports).
228 See Trans Union Corp., FTC No. 9255, 2000 WL 257766, at *12 (Feb. 10, 2000).
229 See CFPB, BUREAU SYMP.: CONSUMER ACCESS TO FINANCIAL RECORDS 6 (2020),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_bureau-symposium-consumer-access-financialrecords_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/NKD9-3CRH] (“Participants disagreed about whether or in what
circumstances the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) applies or should apply to credit-related uses of
permissioned data.”); Press Release, CFPB, CFPB Announces Plan to Issue ANPR on ConsumerAuthorized Access to Financial Data (July 24, 2020), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/newsroom/cfpb-anpr-consumer-authorized-access-financial-data [https://perma.cc/ZNE3-B74J].
230 See, e.g., Ed Mierzwinski & Jeff Chester, Selling Consumers Not Lists: The New World of
Digital Decision-Making and the Role of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 845, 860
(2013) (“The next question for the FTC involves whether new credit-scoring models on the Internet
may cross a moving or blurry line, and become actionable under the FCRA.”); Adam Levitin,
Facebook: the New Credit Reporting Agency?, CREDIT SLIPS (Aug. 22, 2018, 11:39 PM),
https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2018/08/facebook-the-new-credit-reporting-agency.html
[https://perma.cc/V67K-QHEM] (“It’s not clear if this is just a system for internal use or if users’
trustworthiness scores are for sale to third parties, but if the latter, then would sure seem that
Facebook is a Consumer Reporting Agency and subject to CRA provisions of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA).”); Complaint and Request for Investigation, Injunction and Other Relief
224
225
226
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“trustworthiness” scores of their users,231 or if they offer “lookalike” or
“similar” audiences for creditors, landlords, or employers.
Platforms’ advertising practices remain opaque, and more needs to be done
to gain visibility into them. However, as the Commission examines these
practices more closely, it may conclude that the FCRA is implicated,
particularly if certain platforms are developing user profiles that are being
furnished to third-party marketers.232 If so, it will be important to apprise
these platforms of the fact that targeted marketing is not a permissible purpose
under the FCRA. In doing so, the Commission can deploy its Penalty Offense
Authority to complement its existing authorities under the FCRA.
Serving notice of the Commission’s findings in TransUnion would allow
the Commission to establish that the use of consumer reports for targeted
marketing or other impermissible purposes is a penalty offense under the
FTC Act, in addition to being banned by the FCRA. Although the
TransUnion order did not explicitly find that the company’s FCRA violations
constituted unfair or deceptive practices, the FCRA already states this
explicitly,233 meaning that a finding that conduct violates the FCRA is also a
finding that such conduct was unfair or deceptive.234

In the Matter of Airbnb, Inc. ¶¶ 82-88 (FTC Feb. 26, 2020), https://epic.org/privacy/ftc/airbnb/
EPIC_FTC_Airbnb_Complaint_Feb2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/L659-22ZT] (arguing that FCRA
applies to Airbnb).
231 See Elizabeth Dwoskin, Facebook Is Rating the Trustworthiness of Its Users on a Scale from Zero to 1,
WASH. POST. (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/08/21/facebook-israting-trustworthiness-its-users-scale-zero-one [https://perma.cc/9QF8-4R6F] (explaining Facebook’s
trustworthiness score); Karl Brode, Airbnb Has Secret ‘Trustworthy Scores’ and This Privacy Group Is
Demanding to See Them, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Feb. 27, 2020, 12:55 PM), https://www.vice.com/
en_us/article/4ag7vq/airbnb-has-secret-trustworthy-scores-and-this-privacy-group-is-demanding-to-seethem [https://perma.cc/HWZ5-3SVK] (same).
232 These profiles would constitute consumer reports if they (1) bear on a consumer’s “credit
worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics,
or mode of living” and (2) are “used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part” to serve
as a factor in determining credit, employment, or housing eligibility. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1).
Although the FCRA excludes from the definition of consumer report any “report containing
information solely as to transactions or experiences between the consumer and the person making
the report,” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(2)(A)(i), many platforms scrape data from users’ mobile devices,
web browsing, and third-party apps and services.
233 Under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a)(1), “a violation of any requirement or prohibition imposed under
this subchapter shall constitute an unfair or deceptive act or practice in commerce, in violation of
section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act [15 U.S.C. § 45(a)].” 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a)(1).
234 Importantly, this distinguishes the FCRA from TILA, violations of which do not
necessarily constitute unfair or deceptive practices. See United States v. Hopkins Dodge Sales, Inc.,
849 F.2d 311, 314 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that the Commission needed to make a specific finding
that TILA violations were unfair or deceptive for that finding to bind other market participants
pursuant to § 5(m)(1)(B)); Reliable Mortg. Corp., 113 F.T.C. 816, 819 (1990) (following Hopkins
Dodge, contrasting TILA with the FCRA, which “specifically provide[s] that a violation constitutes
an unfair or deceptive practice”).
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Although the Commission can already seek civil penalties through the
FCRA, a strategy that incorporates the Penalty Offense Authority offers a
major advantage. The maximum civil penalty for penalty offenses is more
than ten times greater than what is available through the FCRA alone.235
When it comes to holding tech behemoths accountable for harm to consumers
and fair competition, the Commission must use every tool in its toolbox.
CONCLUSION
Deploying the Penalty Offense Authority should be part of a broader
strategy to resurrect the FTC as a vigorous check against corporate
malfeasance. This Article has detailed how the authority can be used to
notice whole industries of unlawful practices, and to seek remedies that not
only reverse the effects of wrongdoing but also deter others from crossing
the line. We have identified five areas where the Commission has already
condemned practices that can be designated as penalty offenses. Going
forward, as the Commission condemns new forms of misconduct—
particularly around facial recognition, dark patterns, and other emerging
harms—we believe it should include in its orders clear findings that can be
served on other market participants.
In addition to increasing the Agency’s ability to deter and correct
wrongdoing, resurrecting the Penalty Offense Authority would mitigate the
ongoing gamesmanship around § 13(b), showing the marketplace that the
FTC has more than one trick up its sleeve, regardless of AMG.
The Commission’s overwhelming reliance on § 13(b) is of recent vintage.
In the 1970s, following widespread dissatisfaction with “scandalously weak”
no-money orders,236 Congress armed the Commission with strong tools to
meaningfully deter widespread lawbreaking. These tools include rulemaking
powers backed by civil penalties, the ability to seek damages under § 19, and
the Penalty Offense Authority described here. However, these powers were
largely abandoned after James C. Miller III took over the FTC in 1981, as the
Commission shifted its focus to halting scams using § 13(b).
The takeover and subsequent gutting of the Federal Trade Commission
by Chairman Miller is an underappreciated milestone in our nation’s

235 See Adjustments to Civil Penalty Amounts, 85 Fed. Reg. 2003, 2014-15 (codified at 16 C.F.R.
pt. 1) (Jan. 14, 2020) (announcing inflation-adjusted civil penalties of $4,063 under FCRA, and
$43,280 under § 5(m)(1)(B)). This disparity is appropriate, as liability under the Penalty Offense
Authority requires a showing of actual knowledge.
236 Scher et al., supra note 95, at 117.
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economic history.237 By shifting attention and resources away from
scrutinizing emerging business practices that pose harm to households and
honest businesses, Miller and his lieutenants architected a new paradigm for
corporate oversight. The FTC abandoned its former role and began to
duplicate the role of criminal law enforcers who tackle fraud rings, but
without the authority to seek any criminal sanctions. The Commission’s new
emphasis on shutting down “illegitimate” businesses created the guise of an
active Agency, when, in reality, it became increasingly irrelevant to
commercial regulation across many sectors of the economy.
Since the Miller era, the Commission has essentially ceded its role as the
government’s analytical engine of emerging commercial practices. The result
has too often been an Agency that is disconnected from pressing market
problems. In recent decades, the Commission has failed to tackle some of the
worst abuses facing consumers, ranging from subprime mortgage lending to
predatory for-profit colleges. By 2010, as Congress stripped key authorities
from the Commission, industries actively lobbied to remain under FTC
jurisdiction,238 an effort currently being replicated by tech titans in the privacy
arena.239 This does not reflect well on the Agency’s credibility as a watchdog.
For the architects of this ideological project to weaken the FTC, the crisis
around § 13(b) could prove to be the most striking blow yet. They have long
argued that § 13(b) should be used only in cases involving “true fraudsters,”240
and there are now aggressive efforts to impose these limits by law, as part of
any “fix” to § 13(b).241 Should they succeed, this would represent the
culmination of their decades long project to defang this once-storied Agency,
conceived of by Louis Brandeis to be a strong check on corporate power.
But if the FTC is rendered toothless, this is by choice. The Agency can
shed its self-inflicted paralysis by deploying a broader set of tools to meet its
mission. By deploying these tools, the Commission can reemerge as a
237 Recent scholarship is shedding light on this moment, and in particular how many of the
changes Miller sought were driven by well-funded corporate interests. See, e.g., Luke Herrine, The
Folklore of Unfairness 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 431 (2020).
238 Auto dealers were able to obtain a rare exclusion from coverage under the Consumer
Financial Protection Act, remaining instead under FTC jurisdiction. 12 U.S.C. § 5519(d).
239 For example, last year, the industry’s leading trade association argued that Congress should
preempt state privacy laws in favor of a one-size-fits-all framework enforced by the FTC. See
Michael Beckerman, Americans Will Pay a Price for State Privacy Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/opinion/state-privacy-laws.html
[https://perma.cc/8QBWFVRH] (“A national privacy law would be stronger with unified, well-funded enforcement through
the Federal Trade Commission.”).
240 See Beales & Muris, supra note 70, at 40. They further argued that the use of § 13(b) to
target “legitimate” national advertisers “is wrong as a matter of law, troubling as a matter of policy,
and threatens to undermine the operation of the fraud program, which has proven critical to the
FTC’s consumer protection mission.” Id. at 4.
241 See generally id. (arguing for a more limited reading of the Commission’s authority under § 13(b)).
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vigorous watchdog, detecting and deterring systemic harm instead of playing
whack-a-mole against small scams. Adopting this approach is essential to
regaining the public’s confidence and realizing Brandeis’s vision of an Agency
that protects the public from abuse and misuse of corporate power.
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